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ABSTRACT
Strategic management researchers are increasingly interested in the influence of social
media communication on negative social evaluations and firms’ impression management to
reduce negative evaluations. Drawing on communication, psychology, and sociology literature,
this dissertation develops three essays to theoretically and empirically investigates negative
social evaluations on firms, their antecedents, and firm strategies to manage them in the social
media era. In Essay 1, I theorize how social media characteristics—greater access, velocity,
emotionality, and communality—lead to a greater likelihood that social disapproval will
generate, as well as spread faster, be more intense, and connect more constituents. Further, Essay
1 develops a two-stage model that explicates how a firm’s communication strategies are linked to
the four social media characteristics and how they affect a firm’s social disapproval. Essay 2
frames theory to better understand cross-border social disapproval that is interactively mobilized
by social media coverage, national animosity, and nationalism. It tests the theoretical framework
by constructing national dyadic data from 32,007 negative events, 9,699,177 Twitter posts and
186,937 blog posts regarding constituents across 482 US-based multinational enterprises in 48
host countries during 2007 to 2014. Essay 3 builds a theoretical framework depicting how
communication strategies through social media posts and traditional press releases lead firms to
lose or gain constituent support. It tests the theoretical argument using a comprehensive
database, including 1,257,370 tweets and 81,887 press releases from 286 newly public firms in
the US and their constituents during 2007-2016. Taken together, this dissertation contributes to
research on negative social evaluations, multinational enterprises, and impression management in
the era of social media.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
The advent of the social media era has altered the central role of traditional media and
enhanced the power of social media for mobilizing social disapproval. The social media age also
requires a firm to adapt its impression management strategies. However, past research has
focused almost exclusively on social evaluations and impression management through traditional
media, giving little attention to how the addition of social media has changed the dynamics of
social evaluations and impression management. Drawing on communication, psychology, and
sociology literature, I develop three essays, which theoretically and empirically investigate
negative social evaluations, their antecedents, and firm strategies to manage them in the social
media era.
Essay 1 theorizes four social media characteristics—greater access, velocity,
emotionality, and communality—that facilitate constituents generating social disapproval. These
communication characteristics require firms to provide different strategies at different stages of
social disapproval accumulation. This essay argues that initial transparency through selfdisclosure attenuates social disapproval. However, when others disclose negative actions, a “no
response” strategy allows most negative stories to die out and give the firm time to craft an
effective response for those stories that spread. When a firm does respond, it may respond
slowly, infrequently, accommodatively, and narrowly in order to attenuate social disapproval.
Essay 1 advances impression management literature by offering more nuanced response
strategies that reflect communication realities of the social media age.
Essay 2 investigates the antecedents of cross-border social disapproval by constructing an
extensive social media and international relations database between the US as a home country
and 48 host countries of 482 multinational enterprises (MNEs) during 2007-2014. This essay
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suggests that increased social media coverage of an MNE’s negative events, which occurred in
its home country, generates greater social disapproval in its host countries. Such cross-border
social disapproval can be amplified if home and host countries experience frequent and strong
animosity. This amplifying effect caused by national animosity will be further heightened when
the host country embraces an aggressive nationalism. Essay 2 advances social evaluation
research by addressing the effects of international relations and national ideology on social
media-mobilized disapproval.
Essay 3 investigates communication strategies through social media posts and traditional
press releases that lead firms to lose or gain constituent support. This essay applies a unique
dataset including 1,257,370 tweets and 81,887 press releases from 286 newly public US firms
and their constituents during 2007-2016. Empirical results show that firm responses via social
media, compared to issuing press releases, are more likely to reduce constituent support.
Moreover, press releases help firms regain constituent support when constituents frequently send
questions to firms through social media. Results also suggest firms make accommodative and
slower responses to constituents on social media. Essay 3 contributes to management research by
exploring the adverse effects of social media communication toward firms.
Next, I will present Essay 1, which is a purely theoretical article illustrating how social
disapproval is generated and how firms manage it in the social media era. Then, I will introduce
Essay 2, which answers questions regarding the way in which social media coverage, national
animosity, and nationalism mobilize an MNE’s social disapproval that spills over from its home
country to a host country. After that, I will present Essay 3, which evaluates the effectiveness of
firm communication strategies through traditional press releases and social media posts.
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CHAPTER 2: ESSAY 1
EXPOSED, FASTER, HOTTER, AND MORE LINKED IN: MANAGING SOCIAL
DISAPPROVAL IN THE SOCIAL MEDIA ERA

3

ABSTRACT
Negative social evaluations and the strategies a firm employs to manage them have
garnered significant attention among management scholars. However, past research has given
less attention to social media’s revolutionary effects on these dynamics. Drawing on
communication and social psychology research, we theorize how four social media
communication characteristics—access, velocity, emotionality, and communality—lead to a
greater probability that social disapproval will generate, spread quickly, intensify, and connect
more constituents. Further, we develop a two-stage model that explicates how a firm’s
communication strategies are linked to the four social media characteristics and how they affect a
firm’s social disapproval, which we define as constituents’ general enmity toward a firm. Our
model predicts differential effectiveness of initial firm communication strategies, self-disclosure
and reticence, depending upon whether constituents learn of negative events from the firm or
from others. Once a firm’s negative actions are widely discussed on social media, we theorize
that a firm can more effectively attenuate social disapproval when it responds slowly,
infrequently, accommodatively, and narrowly. Our theory advances a more nuanced
understanding of firm-constituent relationships that reflects the generation and management of
social disapproval in the social media era.
Keywords: Social disapproval, perception management, social media
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Management researchers have become increasingly interested in how the media influence
constituents’ negative social evaluations of firms and how a firm manages these evaluations
(Bednar, 2012; Bednar, Boivie, & Prince, 2013; Bundy & Pfarrer, 2015; Lamin & Zaheer, 2012;
Pollock & Rindova, 2003; Vergne & Depeyre, 2016; Zavyalova, Pfarrer, Reger, & Shapiro,
2012). Yet past management research has not adequately captured the effects of social media on
constituents’ negative evaluations and a firm’s communication strategies, despite social media’s
meteoric rise over the past decade and their substantive effects on firm outcomes (Kane, Alavi,
LaBianca, & Borgatti, 2014; Saxton & Waters, 2014).
For example, the Facebook video of United Airlines forcibly removing a passenger was
viewed more than 6.8 million times within a few days (Marotti & Zumbach, 2017) and dropped
the airline’s market capitalization nearly one billion dollars (Rushe & Smith, 2017). Similarly,
the Blackfish social media campaign against SeaWorld ended the ocean theme park’s popular
orca attraction and its 26-year business partnership with Southwest Airlines, negatively
impacting SeaWorld’s financial performance (Kumar, 2014; Rhodan, 2015). These rapid and
sweeping effects of constituents’ negative evaluations were almost unimaginable before the rise
of social media. For instance, anti-smoking activists were unable to ignite widespread boycotts
of Nabisco’s tobacco products, despite several months of a vigorous public relations campaign
(Horovitz, 1990).
Such scholarly and industry evidence suggests that the social media era has exposed the
boundary conditions and limitations of past research (Capozzi & Rucci, 2013; Hewett, Rand,
Rust, & van Heerde, 2016; Leonardi & Vaast, 2017). Not only have social media “shifted modes
of communication that shunt aside the older ones” (Kovarik, 2015: 1), but they also have altered
the ways that negative social evaluations are generated, therefore requiring a firm to rethink its
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communication strategies (Coombs, 2009; Ma, Sun, & Kekre, 2015). Thus, social media present
new and different challenges for firms to manage their negative evaluations, yet management
scholars have not examined these challenges nor have they theorized about how social media
impact the effectiveness of a firm’s communication strategies.
In this paper, we develop new theory that delineates the characteristics of constituents’
negative social evaluations and the strategies a firm employs to manage them in the social media
era. To do so, we first develop the construct social disapproval, which reflects constituents’
general enmity toward a firm (Bundy & Pfarrer, 2015; Vergne, 2012; Zavyalova et al., 2012),
and we distinguish it from two other negative social evaluations, stigma and negative reputation.
We then link social disapproval to a firm’s constituents, those individuals who observe, evaluate,
and potentially interact with the firm, including those who are more directly engaged as well as
more diffuse observers (Bundy & Pfarrer, 2015; Fombrun, 1996; Haack, Pfarrer, & Scherer,
2014; Lange & Washburn, 2012; Pollock, Mishina, & Seo, 2016; Zavyalova, Pfarrer, & Reger,
2017). Given that social media allow for any constituent with an Internet connection to evaluate
a firm, we theorize that the social disapproval-constituent link is the most appropriate one for our
context. That is, we are interested in constituents’ “generalized, non-attribute-specific” negative
attitudes that “transcend stakeholder group boundaries” (Bundy & Pfarrer, 2015; Rindova &
Martins, 2012: 22) and that can adversely influence firm outcomes such as resource acquisition,
financial performance, market value, constituent support, and business network quality (Pollock
& Rindova, 2003; Sullivan, Haunschild, & Page, 2007; Zavyalova, Pfarrer, Reger, & Hubbard,
2016).
Following our explication of the social disapproval construct, we argue that four social
media communication characteristics—access, velocity, emotionality, and communality—leave
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firms more exposed to a faster, more intense, and more connected generation of social
disapproval (Bennett & Segerberg, 2012; Haythornthwaite, 2005; Hon, 2015; Jin & Liu, 2010;
Kane et al., 2014). Access refers to the ability for firm actions to be uncovered and shared by
constituents (Treem & Leonardi, 2013). Velocity refers to how quickly constituents’ negative
perceptions reach other constituents (Manela, 2014). Emotionality denotes the level of affective
appeals and the level of affective responses that content elicits among constituents (Cho et al.,
2003). Communality accrues when there is a spirit of cooperation among empathetic and
mutually supportively constituents (Goodwin, 1996; Haythornthwaite, 2005), even among those
who have never met in person.
Drawing on communications and social psychology research (e.g., Arpan & Pompper,
2003; Arpan & Roskos-Ewoldsen, 2005; Claeys & Cauberghe, 2012; Coombs, 2009, 2010; Liu,
Austin, & Jin, 2011; Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000; McFarland & Ployhart, 2015; Slater, 2015),
we then argue that how social disapproval generates and spreads in social media has changed the
decision calculus for managers, who must rethink when and how they communicate with
constituents (Luo, Zhang, & Marquis, 2016; Ma et al., 2015). Specifically, given the increased
access, velocity, emotionality, and communality associated with social media, we develop a twostage model that explicates how a firm’s communication strategies link to the four social media
characteristics and how they affect its social disapproval. Initially, the effectiveness of
communication strategies depends on whether the firm self-discloses negative actions or the
actions are disclosed by others. We argue that initial transparency through self-disclosure
attenuates social disapproval. When others disclose negative actions, we suggest the firm
practice reticence, defined as a “no response” strategy, to allow most negative stories to die out
and to give the firm time to craft an effective response for those stories that spread. In the second
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stage, when a firm does respond, we argue that it should respond slowly, infrequently,
accommodatively, and narrowly.
Social media are gaining in influence, yet management research lags in understanding
how social media affect how firms manage negative perceptions (cf. Leonardi & Vaast, 2017;
Luo et al., 2016; Zavyalova et al., 2012). Extending current research, our paper makes three
primary contributions. First, we develop new theory about social media’s effects on the
generation of social disapproval, while also developing this new construct to reflects social
media’s reach and constituents’ perceptions. Second, we explicate social media’s key
communication characteristics—greater access, velocity, emotionality, and communality—and
how they leave firms more exposed to a faster, more intense, and more connected generation of
social disapproval. Finally, we advance perception management research by developing a twostage model that delineates how a firm’s different communication strategies affect its social
disapproval. Together, our theory advances more nuanced relationships between a firm and its
constituents that reflect the generation and management of social disapproval in the social media
era.
THE SOCIAL MEDIA CONTEXT
Management scholars have become increasingly interested in the role that the media play
in fostering negative social evaluations of firms and how firms manage these evaluations (Bundy
& Pfarrer, 2015; Vergne, 2012; Zavyalova et al., 2012). Yet this stream of research has focused
almost exclusively on the role of journalist-led, traditional media, such as radio, television, and
print (Zavyalova et al., 2017), with little effort devoted to the role of constituent-led, Internetbased social media in influencing constituents’ negative evaluations and firms’ communication
strategies (Hewett et al., 2016; Leonardi & Vaast, 2017; Luo et al., 2016).
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Before social media’s rise about a decade ago (Levinson, 2009), public perceptions were
largely influenced by the traditional media’s gatekeeping role (Brennen, 1995; Kovarik, 2015),
given that few constituents had direct contact with firms (Alvesson, 1990; Puglisi & Snyder,
2011). Thus, constituents relied on the journalist-led media to deliver information to them, which
also meant that constituents’ evaluations were shaped by how the media dramatized firm
behaviors (Zavyalova et al., 2017).
The media’s gatekeeping role also suggests that negative social evaluations of firms were
less likely to be generated, spread more slowly, involved less emotion, and connected fewer
constituents who shared common grievances. For example, constituents learned about most
negative events such as oil spills, child labor violations, and controversial stances on social
issues almost exclusively from traditional media sources. Given these sources’ control of access
to the content and dissemination of firm information to constituents, traditional media also
allowed firms greater potential to manage public perceptions that limited constituents’ access to
negative information (Zavyalova et al., 2017). In particular, firms could work with journalists to
co-create favorable content without constituents knowing the extent of their influence (Fiss &
Hirsch, 2005; Kennedy, 2008). In addition, journalistic norms dictated the tempering of
emotionality in favor of objectivity and communication in traditional media was primarily from
the media source to constituents, with little opportunity for constituents to find others who share
their concerns. In this sense, journalists and firms often worked in concert, becoming “vital
member[s] of the social organism” with considerable influence over constituent perceptions
(Brennen, 1995: 206). Therefore, constituent grievances could be more easily extinguished
before they led to widespread negative evaluations.
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However, with the growth of social media, the number of constituents who rely on
traditional media sources has decreased precipitously (Keen, 2012). For example, traditional
media usage, including TV, broadcast radio, and print press, declined about 15% between 2012
and 2016 (Mander & Young, 2017) . Social media have become increasingly important sources
of information about firms, as well as platforms for constituents to share their negative
evaluations of firms. In 2017, roughly 54% of the world’s population have active social media
accounts, which increased 21% over the previous year (Chaffey, 2017). The average user spent
more than two hours daily interacting on social media (Statista, 2016a), which increased about
33% from 2012 to 2016 (Mander & Young, 2017). On average, 12 new users join social media
every second (Smith, 2016).
Such tremendous growth of social media has allowed constituents greater access to
adverse events and thus has changed how constituents learn about firm activities and develop
negative evaluations. Constituents now generate the majority of messages, without gatekeepers,
and with almost unlimited ability to add to, share, and co-create content on multi-directional
communication platforms (Croteau, 2006; Kane et al., 2014; Van Dijck, 2009). In addition, firms
have fewer opportunities to unobtrusively influence the content of what is written about them
because social media host hundreds of millions of content providers (Bughin et al., 2011;
Mangold & Faulds, 2009). For example, constituents post news and opinions on Twitter in real
time, often without asking firms to comment on the story before it is published. Users also
distribute self-created videos on YouTube, and they share observations, opinions, and amateur
photographs on Facebook and Instagram. The addition of those communication tools has caused
firms to have less control of communications about them and has facilitated the potential for
greater development of negative social evaluations. Specifically, we argue below that social
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media facilitate the accumulation of a distinct type of negative social evaluation, social
disapproval.
SOCIAL MEDIA CHARACTERISTICS AND SOCIAL DISAPPROVAL
The distinct characteristics of social media, specifically the ability to give constituents
greater access to firm information and quickly link them in unmediated and more emotion-laden
communications, suggest the need for a new construct to reflect constituents’ generalized enmity
toward a firm. We use the term “social disapproval” to describe this form of negative evaluation.
Given that social media allow for anyone with an Internet connection to evaluate a firm, from
more active stakeholders to those who were previously “uninterested and uninformed” (Pfarrer,
DeCelles, Smith, & Taylor, 2008a; Price, 1992: 36), we theorize that it is the most appropriate
social evaluation for our context. Below, we develop social disapproval as a construct that is
distinct from two other negative social evaluations, stigma and negative reputation, in terms of
its definition, cognitive basis, and group specificity. Table 1.1 summarizes these differences and
serves as a guide for the remainder of this section.
--------------------------------Insert Table 1.1 about here
--------------------------------Social Disapproval
Social disapproval represents constituents’ general enmity toward a firm (Bundy &
Pfarrer, 2015; Vergne, 2012; Zavyalova et al., 2012). Social disapproval differs from other
negative social evaluations in two important ways. First, in generating social disapproval,
constituents use cognitive shortcuts to make quick, intuitive, holistic, and more affective
evaluations of a firm instead of employing more deliberate, explicit, specific, and analytical
judgments of firm actions (Bundy & Pfarrer, 2015; March & Simon, 1958). For instance, an
American Banker Survey found Bank of America (BOA) customers as well as non-customers
11

expressed general negative feelings about the bank, including observations such as, “If I want to
ruin my day, all I have to do is call up Bank of America” (Maxfield, 2013: 1). This results in
more diffuse animosity and ill will directed at the firm rather than specific concerns about a
particular action.
Second, social disapproval is formed by constituents rather than by specific stakeholder
groups. Constituents are individuals who observe, evaluate, and potentially interact with the firm,
including those who are more directly engaged as well as more diffuse observers (Bundy &
Pfarrer, 2015; Fombrun, 1996; Haack et al., 2014; Lange & Washburn, 2012; Pollock et al.,
2016; Zavyalova et al., 2017). In this way, constituents “transcend stakeholder group
boundaries” (Bundy & Pfarrer, 2015; Rindova & Martins, 2012: 22). For instance, when Mylan
Pharmaceuticals announced a significant price increase for its EpiPen severe allergy drug
delivery system, a diverse set of constituents—parents who lost children to allergic reactions,
schools, municipalities, families struggling with co-payments for a life-saving drug, others who
were simply angry at perceived corporate greed, Congress, and state attorneys general who
threatened investigations—united on social media to share their disapproval of the firm (Chester,
2016). In other words, social disapproval engages constituents who are not bound by specific
stakeholder groups.
Stigma and Negative Reputation
Stigma and negative reputation differ from social disapproval in terms of their
definitions, cognitive bases, and group specifications. Stigma is an extreme and often longlasting negative social evaluation evoked by firm actions that stakeholders perceive as deeply
flawed and discredited (Devers, Dewett, Mishina, & Belsito, 2009; Mishina & Devers, 2012),
including manufacturing arms for terrorism and egregious wrongdoing that results in dissolution
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of the firm (Vergne, 2012; Xia, Dawley, Jiang, Ma, & Boal, 2016). Stigma is the result of more
deliberate and analytical evaluations because it requires stakeholders to clearly understand the
firm’s unfavorable characteristics (Vergne, 2012). Unlike social disapproval, stigma is perceived
by “a specific stakeholder group as having values that are expressly counter to its own” (Devers
et al., 2009: 157). For example, certain groups of stakeholders stereotype and stigmatize “sinful”
business (Hong & Kacperczyk, 2009: 16) related to AIDS, gaming, or weapons (Herek & Glunt,
1988; Hudson & Okhuysen, 2009; Vergne, 2012).
Negative reputation, in contrast to social disapproval, is a firm’s inability to deliver or
create value in a given domain for particular stakeholders (Fombrun, 2012; Lange, Lee, & Dai,
2011; Zavyalova et al., 2017). A firm’s negative reputation is triggered by behaviors that are
incongruent with expectations in specific domains, such as poor financial or environmental
performance, although these negative evaluations are not as extreme or as resistant to updating as
stigma (Mishina & Devers, 2012; Pfarrer, Pollock, & Rindova, 2010; Zavyalova et al., 2016). A
negative reputation is a result of more analytical and deliberate judgment of a firm’s unlikelihood
of meeting current expectations (Bundy & Pfarrer, 2015; Zavyalova et al., 2017), and it is
evaluated by specific stakeholder groups such as consumers, security analysts, and
environmentalists (Fombrun, 2012). For example, RepRisk, a risk analytics and metrics provider,
releases firm reputation rankings monthly based on perceptions from specific stakeholder groups
who care about the environment, society, and governance issues.
Whereas social disapproval distinguishes itself from other negative evaluations regarding
its definition, cognitive basis, and group specification, we acknowledge that there is a natural
overlap between social disapproval and other negative evaluations in terms of their effects on
firm outcomes (Bundy & Pfarrer, 2015). For example, a firm suffering negative evaluations may
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face difficulty acquiring resources, attracting investors, and maintaining the quality of its
business networks (Deephouse & Suchman, 2008; Sullivan et al., 2007; Zavyalova et al., 2012).
However, unlike other negative social evaluations that lead to negative consequences from
specific stakeholder groups, social disapproval has more diffuse consequences for firms because
it colors the reactions of constituents across stakeholder groups to subsequent actions (Bundy &
Pfarrer, 2015). For instance, after garnering significant social disapproval based on prior
negative actions, BOA followed other banks by increasing debit card fees. While the other banks
that raised fees suffered little negative reaction from constituents, BOA’s fee increase triggered a
social media backlash that extended beyond customers affected by the fee increase. Because
constituents automatically and holistically applied their prior social disapproval or “previously
stored rules of thumb” (Fiske & Taylor, 2013: 55) that BOA was an inherently and generally bad
firm, more than 300,000 constituents across multiple stakeholder groups—including President
Obama—signing online petitions to publicly declare their displeasure (Mui, 2011).
Given that the characteristics of social disapproval—constituents’ “generalized, nonattribute-specific” negative attitudes (Bundy & Pfarrer, 2015; Rindova & Martins, 2012: 22)
correspond with the characteristics of social media—that social media allow for anyone with an
Internet connection to evaluate a firm—we suggest it is the appropriate negative social
evaluation construct for our theory development. In the following sections, we examine the
generation and management of social disapproval in the social media era.
A SOCIAL MEDIA THEORY OF SOCIAL DISAPPROVAL GENERATION
In this section, we develop theory to explicate how social disapproval is generated based
on four social media communication characteristics—access, velocity, emotionality, and
communality. Drawing from communications research (Haythornthwaite, 2005; Hon, 2015; Jin
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& Liu, 2010; Stephens & Malone, 2009), we argue these characteristics make social disapproval
more likely to generate, spread more quickly, be more intense, and connect more constituents.
Table 1.2 outlines these characteristics, their key mechanisms, and their effects on social
disapproval.
---------------------------------Insert Table 1.2 about here
----------------------------------Greater Access Generates Greater Likelihood of Social Disapproval
Greater access refers to constituents’ ability to easily uncover and share information
about firm actions on social media (Treem & Leonardi, 2013). We therefore theorize that social
disapproval is more likely to be generated on social media because constituents have greater
mobility, which allows their easy access to a greater portion of negative firm actions (Kaplan &
Haenlein, 2010). This mobility reflects the constituents’ greater ease to connect to social media
through their personal mobile devices at nearly any time or place (Kaplan, 2012). Thus, firm
actions are more likely to be posted and read in real time by constituents, including investors,
bystanders, victims, concerned employees, and activists.
For example, in United Airlines’ overbooking incident, several passengers made videos
of a 69-year-old doctor being dragged down the aisle by uniformed officers (Thompson, 2017).
Another passenger video showed one of the officers forcibly removing the doctor from his seat,
causing his face to violently hit the armrest (Lemon, 2017). Two weeks after the United incident,
a Facebook video filmed by an American Airlines’ passenger showed a sobbing mother after a
flight attendant violently yanked her stroller, accidently hitting her in the process, and risked
injuring her baby (Karimi & Sutton, 2017). In both cases, constituents directly captured and
shared firm actions that previously would have been unlikely to come to other constituents’
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attention because journalists would have been unable or unwilling to report these actions. Thus,
constituents now have far greater access to information about firm actions (Kim, Hsu, & de
Zuniga, 2013).
When constituents know that information is more accessible, they also are more likely to
seek, share, and comment on the information, further increasing other constituents’ access
(Brown & Duguid, 2001). Thus, greater mobility provides constituents with more accessible
information with more than 80% of social media posts being shared from a mobile device
(Schneider, 2015). Whether it is United gate personnel denying boarding to two young girls for
wearing leggings (Lazo, 2017) or Chick-fil-A’s same-sex marriage controversy (Tice, 2012), a
higher percentage of information and constituents’ opinions about firm actions are now publicly
available on social media to a larger number of constituents (Creswell & Maheshwari, 2017). In
sum, greater access implies that a greater number of negative firm actions will become known
and shared among constituents because the mobility of social media enables constituents greater
ease to capture and share significantly more firm actions. Thus, the likelihood of generating
social disapproval is greater.
Proposition 1: Greater access on social media generates a greater likelihood of social
disapproval.
Greater Velocity Generates Faster Social Disapproval
Social media also allow negative information to be shared with greater velocity, which
refers to the speed that constituents’ perceptions generate social disapproval (Hong, Lim, &
Stein, 2000; Manela, 2014). For example, within three days of posting a YouTube video critical
of United’s baggage handling, a disgruntled passenger garnered more than a million views and
United received millions of negative online comments (Carroll, 2013). We theorize that social
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disapproval is generated more quickly on social media because greater velocity is facilitated by
greater publishing and feedback immediacy.
Publishing immediacy indicates the speed at which a constituent’s individual perception
reaches other constituents, while feedback immediacy designates the speed with which
constituents respond to a received message (Levinson, 2009; Nickerson, 2005). On social media,
content about firms is published immediately and feedback is direct from constituents to other
constituents, thus circumventing traditional media publishing and feedback delays (Castelló,
Etter, & Årup Nielsen, 2016; Dimmick, Chen, & Li, 2004; Wu, Hofman, Mason, & Watts,
2011).
For example, environmental activists can immediately post pictures on Facebook of a
firm polluting a river, rather than sending the photos to the traditional media where they might be
published much later (Greenpeace Argentina Tweet, March 11, 2016). Similarly, constituents’
immediate feedback following Dominos’ YouTube crisis in which employees were shown
contaminating food became a Twitter trend within an hour (Veil, Sellnow, & Petrun, 2012), and
problems with the water in Flint, Michigan—the rust color, the odor, residents complaining
about rashes—promptly reached millions of constituents via social media and their negative
comments quickly generated social disapproval toward the Karengondi Water Authority (Smith,
2015). In each case, social disapproval developed extremely fast by means of greater
communication velocity, which was facilitated by greater publishing and feedback immediacy.
Proposition 2: Greater velocity on social media generates faster social disapproval.
Greater Emotionality Generates More Intense Social Disapproval
Social media communications also express greater emotionality, which denotes the level
of affective appeals and the level of affective responses that content elicits among constituents

17

(Cho et al., 2003). We theorize that social disapproval is more intensely negative (“hotter”) (Fiol
& O'Connor, 2002) on social media because constituents’ greater emotional reactions are fueled
by more abundant negative emotional expression.
Emotional expression is the freedom that constituents feel to share their feelings about
firm actions (Andersen & Guerrero, 1997; De Choudhury & Counts, 2012; Myrick, Holton,
Himelboim, & Love, 2016). By its nature, social media enable constituents to express their
negative emotions more freely with less concern of being censored (Hermida, Fletcher, Korell, &
Logan, 2012). In turn, this freer expression evokes greater emotional responses from
constituents, because negative emotions are more salient than positive or neutral emotions to
foster audience resonance (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001; Fiske & Taylor,
2013; Lingle, Geva, Ostrom, Leippe, & Baumgardner, 1979). Additionally, constituents are more
likely to express extreme negative emotions on social media because they can comment
anonymously, obviating the social norm of tempering extreme emotions in direct interactions
(Provine, Spencer, & Mandell, 2007).
Finally, social media provide constituents with enhanced nonverbal emotional content,
such as hyperlinks, images, music, animations, colors, and font types, which adds emotionality
(Scherer & Ceschi, 2000; Small & Verrochi, 2009). For example, videos of brown water
juxtaposed with distraught mothers holding small children express and likely will arouse stronger
affect than tables of numbers correlating lead ingestion with cognitive disabilities or still photos
typically found in newspapers (Coleman, 2006; Rauch, 2016). In sum, because social media
allow greater negative emotional expression, we propose:
Proposition 3: Greater emotionality on social media generates more intense social
disapproval.
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Greater Communality Creates More Connected Social Disapproval
Finally, social media allows for greater communality, which is a spirit of cooperation
where relationships among like-minded constituents are “linked in” and viewed as empathetic
and supportive (Goodwin, 1996; Haythornthwaite, 2005). For instance, constituents such as
animal rights activists, business partners, customers, and others gathered on the Facebook page
called “Protest SeaWorld-the Orlando Community” to support each other’s petitions seeking an
end to orca shows (Facebook@protestseaworldorlando, 2016). We theorize that social
disapproval is generated with greater communality via social media because greater
communality is facilitated by strong collective identity among constituents.
Collective identity is a sense of oneness among individuals based on shared experiences
(Brewer & Gardner, 1996; Polletta & Jasper, 2001; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell,
1987). By cultivating greater collective identity, constituents generate a common bond of “us
against them” instead of “me against them,” where the “us” represents the collective identity of
constituents claiming similar issues (Hardy, Lawrence, & Grant, 2005; Polletta & Jasper, 2001)
and “them” represents the firms perceived to have done wrong. For example, in the EpiPen
pricing scandal, collective identity was quickly built through social media among a diverse set of
constituents while simultaneously portraying Mylan Pharmaceuticals as the enemy—a greedy,
heartless, price-gouging firm (Chester, 2016). As one constituent commented on the power of
social media to create communality, “I'm scared to see our price. My daughter has to have it...she
has a bad nut allergy. If the oil touches her mouth she has a reaction…Does anyone know if the
Allergist have epi pens that they hand out like doctors do with free samples?” Another
constituent replied as “My great grandsons[’] life depends upon it. And they raised diabetes
Meds which also affects my family. And we are angry with the greed of this
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company.”(Facebook@safe4kidss, 2016). Summing up constituents’ communal disapproval, the
Los Angeles Times quipped that this was “another reason to hate Mylan” (Hiltzik, 2016). In sum,
because social media enable strong collective identity among constituents, we propose:
Proposition 4: Greater communality on social media generates more connected social
disapproval.
To recap our theorizing thus far, we have argued that four social media communication
characteristics—greater access, velocity, emotionality, and communality—lead to a greater
probability that social disapproval will generate, spread more quickly, be more intense, and
connect more constituents. Given that social disapproval can lead to negative outcomes, it
follows that a firm will attempt to manage constituents’ negative perceptions of its actions.
Below, we develop a two-stage, theoretical model that explicates how a firm’s communication
strategies—transparency, reticence, speed, frequency, accommodativeness, and breadth—affect
its initial social disapproval as well as its disapproval over time.
MANAGING SOCIAL DISAPPROVAL ON SOCIAL MEDIA
A firm manages its social disapproval through a set of coordinated communications and
actions that attempts to influence constituents’ perceptions about the firm (Bundy & Pfarrer,
2015; Coombs, 1995; Elsbach, 1994). Whereas management research on how firms mitigate
negative social evaluations is growing, it has focused mainly on communication strategies
available via traditional media sources, such as issuing press releases and granting interviews to
reporters (e.g., Bundy & Pfarrer, 2015; Desai, 2011; Graffin, Bundy, Porac, Wade, & Quinn,
2013; Lamin & Zaheer, 2012; Westphal & Deephouse, 2011; Zavyalova et al., 2012). However,
we theorize that a firm’s communication strategies have different effects on social media (Saxton
& Waters, 2014).
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Given the social media communication characteristics that we have explicated above—
that social media allows greater access and is faster, hotter, and more linked in—we theorize
below that the effectiveness of a firm’s communication strategies depends on understanding and
disrupting these characteristics. Specifically, we argue that transparency, reticence, speed,
frequency, accommodativeness, and breadth—affect a firm’s social disapproval on social media
differently than in the past. We further suggest these strategies are more useful at different stages
of the social disapproval process, a substantive extension of most management research that has
theorized and empirically tested firms’ initial responses to negative evaluations (e.g., Bundy &
Pfarrer, 2015; Zavyalova et al., 2012, 2016). Table 1.3 provides a roadmap of managing social
disapproval, both at the time negative actions are first disclosed to constituents (Stage 1) and
over time (Stage 2).
---------------------------------Insert Table 1.3 about here
----------------------------------Stage 1: Managing Initial Social Disapproval
Proactively managing social disapproval through greater transparency. When the
firm has prior knowledge of events that, if made public, might generate social disapproval, the
firm may choose to be secretive—withhold the information in the hope that the story never
becomes public—or to be transparent and proactively disclose the information. We define
transparency as a firm’s intentional self-disclosure, or timely sharing of information, about its
actions with constituents (Schnackenberg & Tomlinson, 2016). Self-disclosure of negative firm
actions runs the risk that this information might be used against the firm (Derlega & Chaikin,
1977), but this risk must be weighed against the risk that the information is made public by
others, who may distort the information in ways that generate more social disapproval than a
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self-announcement (Pfarrer, Smith, Bartol, Khanin, & Zhang, 2008b). Whereas organizational
scholars have theorized and empirically shown the value of transparency for firms following a
negative action covered by traditional media sources (e.g., Bundy & Pfarrer, 2015; Pfarrer et al.,
2008a, b), the effectiveness of a transparency strategy may be greater on social media for three
reasons. First, firms’ negative actions are more likely to be made public today because many
constituents have greater access to firms and share information immediately on social media.
Therefore, while managers’ previous calculus was whether the news would become public,
today’s reckoning is when and how it will become public.
Second, transparency through self-disclosure allows firms to set the initial emotional tone
of the story, potentially negating constituents’ self-generated emotional expression on social
media. A firm that seizes the initiative to frame a story may deter constituents’ motivation to
spread their interpretations of events. Called “stealing thunder,” (Arpan & Pompper, 2003;
Arpan & Roskos-Ewoldsen, 2005; Coombs, 2010), we argue this strategy is more important in
the social media era than in the past. Highly emotional accounts by constituents of negative
events quickly become trending stories, which draw close attention from other constituents, who
also are likely to respond with greater emotionality. Thus, transparency may also effectively
reduce emotionality on the part of audiences through framing potentially negative events more
favorably and less emotionally.
Finally, transparency via self-disclosure may be viewed as the firm voluntarily siding
with constituents because the firm appears to have willingly disclosed information that is
potentially damaging to itself for the benefit of constituents (Pfarrer et al., 2008b). Such selfdisclosures are likely to be viewed as a signal of the firm’s integrity (Schnackenberg &
Tomlinson, 2016), which may neutralize constituents’ negative interpretations of the actions
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(Graffin, Carpenter, & Boivie, 2011). Thus, beliefs in the firm’s integrity may negate
constituents’ collective “us versus them” identity, and thus, attenuate social disapproval.
In sum, the greater access of social media communication favors firms that self-disclose
negative actions, which allows the firm to set the initial emotional tone and prevent constituents
from framing collective identity. For these reasons, greater transparency in initial disclosure of
negative actions attenuates social disapproval. Hence, we propose:
Proposition 5: A proactive transparency strategy avoids social disapproval.
However, achieving transparency through self-disclosure is not always possible.
Constituents may post on social media about a firm’s actions before the firm learns about it, or
actions that the firm thought were neutral or too trivial to disclose may nevertheless generate
social disapproval. When others have disclosed negative actions on social media, firms must
decide if and how they will respond.
Reactively managing social disapproval through reticence. When constituents are the
first to reveal a firm’s negative actions, the firm has the option of responding or pursuing a
reticence strategy, defined as a firm’s choice to not communicate with constituents about the
issue (Carlos & Lewis, 2017; Ferrin, Kim, Cooper, & Dirks, 2007; Sutton & Callahan, 1987).
While we argued above that transparency is often effective at stealing thunder on social media,
we theorize that reticence in response to disclosures of the firm’s negative actions by others is
often more effective than replying. Reticence allows the firm time to see whether an issue is
quickly forgotten, and thus never needs a response, and to formulate a more effective response if
constituents’ individual reactions begin to build into social disapproval.
Reticence often works because constituents have access to large amounts of social media
information, and thus can easily suffer information overload (van Zoonen & van der Meer,
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2015). Overwhelmed by up to 350,000 tweets generated per minute and more than 900 million
online complaints per year (Internet live stats, 2017; Koetsier, 2014), constituents and firms are
unable to read and share everything. Given these distractions, we argue that waiting to see
whether a constituent complaint naturally fades away in the millions of social media messages
may lead to a better outcome than an ill-conceived response. A social media commentator
likened user-generated-content to sparks of fire and social media to gasoline (cf., Baer, 2017)
because constituent complaints are omnipresent on social media, yet many die out without
causing harm. Only a few of the sparks ignite the gasoline of social media to become “hot
button” issues that inspire widespread social disapproval that eventually damages the firm.
Therefore, a firm overwhelmed by the flood of social media complaints might wait to see which
sparks will be potentially fueled by social media.
In addition, failure to respond is interpreted differently in social media than in traditional
media. Given the heavy volume of incoming messages, social media constituents are uncertain
about whether a firm is aware of the issue, and whether and how the firm has responded, often
leading them to give the firm the benefit of the doubt (Capozzi & Rucci, 2013; Kietzmann,
Hermkens, McCarthy, & Silvestre, 2011; Ma et al., 2015). Whereas responding in social media
may act as a reminder to constituents of a story they have already moved on from, and therefore
may trigger re-engagement with the story (Bundy & Pfarrer, 2015), responding is more likely to
extinguish the story in traditional media because journalists usually include the firm’s account of
events in the stories they publish, providing a more balanced and less emotional account. Failure
to respond to journalists’ requests for comment raises suspicions and may be interpreted by
constituents as a sign of having something to hide (Carroll, 2004; Coombs, 2007). Thus,
reticence was historically more likely to lead constituents to assume only firms with something
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to hide will fail to respond (Sutton & Callahan, 1987; Valkenburg, Semetko, & De Vreese, 1999)
while a failure to respond in social media is easily overlooked.
Proposition 6: A reactive reticence strategy attenuates social disapproval.
So far, we have discussed two paths, as part of Step 1, of initial management of social
disapproval: a firm’s proactive transparency strategy and its reactive reticence strategy. Below,
we turn our attention to Step 2 of the process: managing social disapproval on social media over
time. In many cases, initial negativity will fade out naturally. Yet, some negative actions will
begin to gain traction, risking that isolated negative evaluations will build into widespread social
disapproval unless the firm effectively intervenes. The potential for negative firm outcomes, such
as targeting by activists or loss of sales and market value, suggests that a firm needs to carefully
consider its response strategies in terms of speed, frequency, accommodativeness, and breadth.
We theorize that each strategy is primarily effective in disrupting one of the four social media
communication characteristics, as summarized in Table 1.3, while recognizing that each of these
response strategies likely affects other characteristics to some extent.
Stage 2: Managing Social Disapproval over Time
Response speed. Response speed refers to the time between constituents’ knowledge of a
firm’s actions and its initial response (Claeys & Cauberghe, 2012; Coombs, 2010). Public
relations scholars have argued that complaints on social media require faster responses from
firms to preclude isolated constituents’ complaints from diffusing on social media (Coombs,
2010; Jin & Liu, 2010). While this “need for speed” strategy seems logical at first glance,
ironically, slower responses may be more effective at tempering social media’s velocity. Some
anecdotal evidence suggests firms that respond to constituents quickly gain greater social
disapproval than competitors that respond more slowly. This non-intuitive finding exists, we
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argue, because firms that respond quickly run a greater risk of responding inappropriately, which
will lead constituents to more quickly spread social disapproval. For example, BOA was known
for responding promptly within a few minutes on social media (Dugan, 2011). Unfortunately, the
bank’s quick responses often infuriated constituents since they suspected BOA of using
automated response routines in which computers scanned hashtags and sent inappropriate
boilerplates, such as “We are here to help, listen, and learn from our customers and are glad to
assist with any account related inquiries” (Morran, 2013: 1).
Specifically, a quicker response is more likely to be perceived as ill-prepared or
improvised, which is likely to fuel even greater velocity of negative sentiments (Gallaugher &
Ransbotham, 2010). In the case of the elderly passenger being dragged off the plane, United’s
CEO quickly issued at least two statements that further enraged constituents. These hurried
responses led to the initial negative event being spread more quickly and to additional negative
constituent responses to United’s statements. The airline lost over $1 billion in market valuation
before a more effective strategy was finally announced (Willis, 2017). These ill-advised
responses based on incomplete information may have increased social disapproval more than a
slower response (Ferrin et al., 2007). While clearly United needed to respond at some point to
this negative event because it generated substantial social disapproval, they would have been
better off, we argue, if they had taken the time to learn all the facts and to understand the
constituents’ point of view before responding. A firm’s slower response might be perceived as
more relevant, reliable, and authentic because a firm had spent time investigating the event and
considered constituents’ interpretations. When a response is perceived as trustworthy,
constituents are less like to generate additional negative postings, thus, slowing velocity.
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In sum, logic and growing anecdotal evidence suggest that firms should consider
responding to the greater speed of social media more slowly. Hence, a slower response may
disrupt velocity and allows a firm more time to frame a thoughtful and consistent response,
further slowing velocity.
Proposition 7: A slower response strategy attenuates social disapproval.
Response frequency. If the firm’s initial response does not halt the spread of negativity,
firms may be tempted to respond to every new posting. We suggest a firm may be better served
by ignoring a wave of messages because frequent responses increase access to the firm’s actions,
while also raising concerns about the firm’s motives. As we argued above, greater access is more
likely to increase social disapproval. Frequency refers to the number of times a firm responds to
constituents’ concerns and less frequent responses limits constituents’ access to the negative
event (Godes & Mayzlin, 2004). With less access, constituents are more likely to shift their
attention to other issues. For example, United Airlines might have been tempted to respond when
constituents tweeted “Great story! Share! Share! Share!” or “More than 15 million people know
who they WON’T fly with,” (Twitter, 2016), but those messages did not reference United
specifically. When reading these posts, distracted constituents were less likely to know (or
remember) which airline these accusations targeted. Yet, if United had responded, more
constituents would have gained greater access to the negative event, potentially tempting more
constituents to respond, effectively keeping the story alive. In order to disrupt access, a firm
should not frequently remind constituents of negative events, but allow social media’s massive
and irrelevant information streams to distract constituents’ attention (van Zoonen & van der
Meer, 2015).
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In addition, frequent responses may also raise additional concerns about the firm, which
may prompt constituents to seek out additional information about the firm’s negative actions,
further increasing access. Multiple responses may be perceived as excessive and disingenuous,
eliciting a “methinks the lady doth protest too much” reaction from constituents like Queen
Gertrude questioning the sincerity of repeated responses in Shakespeare’s Hamlet. For example,
constituents questioned BOA’s motives when it responded on social media more than 30 times to
a single issue within a few hours (Eksith, 2013; Madrigal, 2014). Likewise, in handling a car
accident, Progressive Insurance responded publicly to a claimant every three to five minutes with
the same content “@alexblagg This is a tragic case, and our sympathies go out to Mr. Fisher and
his family for the pain…” (Dugan, 2014). Accordingly, these overly frequent responses aroused
greater social disapproval towards BOA and Progressive.
A particularly harmful form of frequency results from responding before all the facts are
known and, thus, issuing frequent, potentially inconsistent narratives as the firm learns additional
information. Frequent and inconsistent responses may cause constituents to suspect the veracity
of any given response (Granhag & Strömwall, 1999; Vrij et al., 2009). For example, after the
documentary Blackfish accused SeaWorld of inappropriate animal care (Cowperthwaite &
Oteyza, 2013), SeaWorld hastily initiated a social media campaign that listed 69 reasons to
discredit Blackfish (SeaWorld Cares, 2014a, c). However, the company later changed its
responses by admitting Blackfish documentary included many valid criticisms (SeaWorld Cares,
2014b; SeaWorld Facebook, 2016). Because the campaign included inconsistent and
contradictory responses, constituents increasingly doubted SeaWorld’s truthfulness, which led to
greater social disapproval and ultimately to the decision to phase out the previously most popular
attraction, orca shows.

28

In sum, less frequent responses disrupt access to negative events and avoid providing
opportunities for more constituents to add additional complaints and question the firm’s motives
and character. Less frequent responses allow constituents’ attention to be distracted by unrelated
topics that constantly fill social media user’s newsfeeds.
Proposition 8: A less frequent response strategy attenuates social disapproval.
Response accommodativeness. While a firm’s slower and less frequent responses may
mitigate social disapproval on social media more effectively than hasty and frequent responses,
how a firm responds may also have differential effects. We theorize that a more accommodative
response will temper social disapproval more effectively because such a response reduces
constituents’ greater motivation to express their emotions, discouraging the greater emotionality
of social media. A more accommodative response attempts to manage social disapproval by
accepting more responsibility and acknowledging a firm’s role in the events leading to
constituents’ negative perceptions (Bundy & Pfarrer, 2015).
A more accommodative response takes the wind out of constituents’ sails by reducing
their emotional expression, and it validates constituents’ beliefs by acknowledging the
appropriateness of their concerns (Bundy & Pfarrer, 2015; Jin, Liu, & Austin, 2014; Lamin &
Zaheer, 2012; Liu et al., 2011). For example, after a customer tweeted, “Don’t fly
@BritishAirways, their customer service is horrendous,” British Airways responded
accommodatively: “We would like to apologise to the customer for the inconvenience caused.
We have been in contact with the customer, and the bag is due to be delivered today.” (British
Airways Tweet, September 2, 2013). In doing so, British Airways validated the customer’s
concerns and emotions, and solved his problem. Thus, they reduced the likelihood of further
negative comments.
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However, a firm’s failure to be more accommodative can amplify future negative
emotional expression (Mayer, Greenbaum, Kuenzi, & Shteynberg, 2009). For example,
following the United Breaks Guitars incident, constituents on social media demanded an apology
from United and vented their concerns about mistreated pets, poor customer service, and being
victims of damaged luggage. Because United appeared to constituents as less accommodative by
denying the customer’s account of events, defending United’s policies and procedures, and
refusing restitution for his and other constituents’ losses, constituents’ emotions became more
intensely negative against United (Kietzmann et al., 2011; Tripp & Grégoire, 2011).
In sum, a more accommodative response via social media takes the wind out of
complaining constituents’ sails primarily by reducing social media’s greater emotionality. Hence,
we propose:
Proposition 9: A more accommodative response strategy attenuates social disapproval.
Response breadth. The final aspect of a firm’s response strategy that we consider is
response breadth. Breadth is defined as the number of constituents who see the firm’s response
(Godes & Mayzlin, 2004). In the extreme, the narrowest response breadth would be a private
message sent only to the initial complainant, which would appear to all other constituents as
reticence or no response. Narrower responses impede the development of commonality by
preventing other constituents from adding additional complaints to the original complaint
(Haines, 2015). For example, a guest tweeted that he disliked the view from his hotel room.
Instead of responding broadly and providing other constituents an opportunity to weigh in with
their own complaints about the hotel chain, Marriott privately responded to the guest and offered
a room with a better view and his initial social media complaint was not picked up by others
(Haines, 2015).
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However, some firms feel compelled to respond broadly on social media. These firms
post on multiple social media platforms to inform all their social media followers about their
response to issues raised by one or a few constituents. This may be misguided because broader
responses provide opportunities for constituents to build greater communality. Broad firm
responses provide opportunities for other disgruntled constituents to pour additional fuel on the
fire by adding unrelated complaints and sharing more negative evaluations (Gallaugher &
Ransbotham, 2010). For instance, attempting to rebuild trust after the 2008 financial crisis,
JPMorgan Chase (JPM) challenged all its Twitter followers to tweet a question using the firm’s
hashtag. Unfortunately, constituents interpreted the request as an opportunity to complain about
JPM’s financial manipulations. Thus, many questions were unflattering to JPM such as “I have
Mortgage Fraud, Market Manipulation, Credit Card Abuse, Libor Rigging and Predatory
Lending. AM I DIVERSIFIED?” and “Can I have my house back?” (Burnham, 2014). In this
way, firms that have already accumulated some social disapproval who attempt to broadly
interact with constituents on social media may solidity an “us vs. them” commonality that will
generate even greater social disapproval. Hence, we propose:
Proposition 10: A narrower response strategy attenuates social disapproval.
DISCUSSION
In this paper, we have argued that social media are quickly becoming the primary sources
of information about a firm, yet management research lags in understanding how social media
affect constituents’ negative perceptions and how a firm manages its social disapproval (cf.
Leonardi & Vaast, 2017; Luo et al., 2016; Zavyalova et al., 2012). Extending current research,
we offer three major contributions to management theory. First, we developed new theory about
social media’s effects on the generation of social disapproval, while also developing this new
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construct to reflects social media’s reach and constituents’ perceptions. Second, we explicated
how social media’s key communication characteristics leave firms more exposed to greater
social disapproval generation. Finally, we developed a two-stage model that delineates how a
firm’s different communication strategies affect its initial social disapproval and constituents’
negative perceptions over time. Our work contributes to research on social evaluations (Bundy &
Pfarrer, 2015), the media’ role in social disapproval accumulation (Zavyalova et al., 2012), and
perception management theory (Pollock et al., 2016). We also believe our work has practical
implications for firms interested in improving their social media strategies. Below, we detail our
theoretical and practical contributions as well as potential future research directions.
Contributions to Theory
We advanced social evaluations and perception management research in three primary
ways. First, we developed the construct of social disapproval and contrasted it with two other
negative social evaluations, stigma and negative reputation. Social evaluations research
continues to evolve, and given that social media allow for nearly anyone to intuitively evaluate a
firm, we argued for the need to create a construct that reflects constituents’ general enmity
toward a firm rather than relying on constructs that reflect more specific and deliberate
stakeholder judgments (cf. Bundy & Pfarrer, 2015). As social media gain in use and
prominence, constituents who were once “uninterested and uninformed” (Pfarrer et al., 2008a;
Price, 1992: 36) will have greater access to firm information and greater ability to share their
disapproval of the firm. Thus, social evaluations research should continue to expand to consider
the effects of “bystander” perceptions and how the firm manages these evaluations vis a vis
stigma and negative reputation.

32

Second, by identifying key social media communication characteristics and their effects
on social disapproval. Prior research has focused almost exclusively on the traditional media
context, while we have shown how social disapproval accumulates differently today, therefore
necessitating new theorizing. We provided a framework to guide future empirical investigations
of social media’s role in fostering social disapproval. Our framework enriches social disapproval
theory by specifying four key communication characteristics that affect social disapproval—
access, velocity, emotionality, and communality—that are all greater in the social media era.
Third, we extended perception management research by developing a two-stage model.
In the initial stage, we suggested firms might avoid social disapproval by practicing greater
transparency by stealing thunder from a firm’s critics through self-disclosure of negative events
before social disapproval begins to accumulate. When negative actions are disclosed by others,
our theory suggests firms should initially remain reticent. If these initial strategies prove
ineffective, we argued that firms should consider four response strategies in the second stage:
speed, frequency, accommodativeness, and breadth. We theorized that slower, less frequent,
more accommodative and narrower responses are most likely to effectively dampen social
disapproval generated in social media. Recent literature has explored perception management
strategies utilizing traditional media (e.g., Bednar, 2012; Bednar et al., 2013; Zavyalova et al.,
2012. Our paper suggested that perception management research investigate not only a firm’s
interaction through traditional media but also via social media. In sum, we have developed a
more comprehensive and nuanced framework to manage social disapproval in the social media
era.
For theoretical clarity, we discussed each response strategy separately and identified the
characteristic of social media that each response strategy primarily disrupts, while
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acknowledging that these strategies are likely to be operated coordinately by a firm. Taken
together, these arguments suggest it is more effective for firms to respond slowly, infrequently,
accommodatively, and narrowly to negative events discussed in social media. Issuing a hastily
constructed and poorly worded response may make matters worse, and trying to correct the
initial poor response through repeated subsequent messages may also be poorly received.
Contributions to Practice
Our paper also has practical applications for managers and firms. Managers are well
advised to be concerned about constituents’ perceptions and actions, given their enhanced ability
to voice concerns in social media that may quickly be shared and amplified by other displeased
constituents. We encourage firms to carefully consider when transparency and reticence might be
wiser courses of action. With the understanding of response strategy options, managers can tailor
responses to address various situations. Finally, social media are regularly touted as useful, lowcost forums for smaller and newer firms to gain constituents (Fischer & Reuber, 2011), yet our
theory might give such firms pause about how best to pursue a social media strategy. Overall, we
hope our article will inspire more management studies to theorize and investigate the social
disapproval issues in the social media era.
Future Research Directions
A primary goal of this paper has been to redirect social disapproval research from its
almost exclusive focus on traditional media to consider the generation and management of social
disapproval on social media. Thus, we call for empirical research using our theoretical
framework to explore the relationships in the social media era. The constructs in our model are
measurable through computational and qualitative content analysis (Duriau, Reger, & Pfarrer,
2007). For instance, emotionality can be measured using Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count
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(Pfarrer et al., 2010; Zavyalova et al., 2012) or other sentiment analysis software. Network
analysis can be used to study communality by examining the spread of social disapproval
through on-line social networks.
We developed mechanisms that influence each social media characteristic. We recognize
the possibility that there may be additional mechanisms that generate access, velocity,
emotionality, and communality, and we invite future research to focus not only on testing the
mechanisms we describe, but also to seek to uncover additional mechanisms. Likewise, we
concentrated on response strategies that bridge a wide variety of situations to achieve greater
generalizability. We believe these are the most promising characteristics for future research.
However, our intention was not to formulate a “fully saturated model.” Instead, we theorized an
important first step to guide empirical research across a variety of industry settings. We
recognize each industry has unique characteristics and our model may apply better in some
settings, such as consumer facing, publicly traded companies.
In conclusion, more than ever before, the social media era leaves firms more exposed to
social approval generation that is faster, hotter, and more linked in. It therefore behooves
scholars and managers alike to develop more robust theoretical, empirical, and practical solutions
to social media’s revolutionary effects on social evaluations and firms’ management strategies.
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APPENDIX
Table 1. 1. Comparison of Social Disapproval and Other Negative Social Evaluations
Definition

Social Disapproval
General enmity toward
a firm

Stigma
“[A] collective perception
that the organization is
deeply flawed and
discredited” (Devers et al.,
2009: 155)

Negative Reputation
A firm’s inability to create
value in a given domain
(Zavyalova et al., 2017)

Cognitive
base

Intuitive and affective
judgment

Analytical and deliberate
judgment (Vergne, 2012)

Analytical and deliberate
judgment (Zavyalova et al.,
2017)

Group
specificity

Constituents across
multiple stakeholder
groups

“[A] critical mass of
members within a
stakeholder group” (Devers
et al., 2009: 162)

“[A] specific group of
stakeholders” (Fombrun,
2012: 100)

Table 1. 2. Social Media Characteristics, Mechanisms, and Influence on Social Disapproval
Characteristic
Access

Key Mechanism
Ability

Influence on Social Disapproval
More likely to be generated (P1)

Velocity

Publishing and feedback
immediacy

Generated faster (P2)

Emotionality

Abundant emotional expression

Generated with more intense emotions (P3)

Communality

Collective identity of constituents

Generated with more connectivity (P4)
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Table 1. 3. Managing Social Disapproval in the Social Media Era
Strategy

Key Mechanism

Outcome

Stage 1: Initial Disclosure
Proactive transparency (P5)

Stealing thunder

Reduces the likelihood of
social disapproval

Reactive reticence (P6)

Wait and see

Ignores the “sparks” of
social disapproval

Slower response (P7)

Velocity

Slows the development of
social disapproval

Less frequent response (P8)

Access

Reduces the messages that remind
constituents of negative firm actions

More accommodative response (P9)

Emotionality

Tempers negative emotions

Narrower response (P10)

Commonality

Prevents more constituents from
adding to social disapproval

Stage 2: Over Time
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CHAPTER 3: ESSAY 2
CROSS-BORDER SOCIAL DISAPPROVAL: SOCIAL MEDIA COVERAGE,
NATIONAL ANIMOSITY, AND NATIONALISM AS INTEGRATED MOBILIZATIONS
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ABSTRACT
Multinational enterprises (MNEs) increasingly operate in an interconnected social media
world, which effectively delivers negative information on a global scale and mobilizes
constituents to accumulate social disapproval across national boundaries. In this social media
world, negative events no longer are contained to the home country, yet, theory does not account
for the way that negative events lead to social disapproval across borders. Therefore, we develop
theory to better understand cross-border social disapproval, which refers to an MNE’s negative
events in its home country that lead to its social disapproval in its host countries. In this study,
we develop a model whereby three key factors—social media coverage, national animosity, and
nationalism—interactively mobilize cross-border social disapproval. We test this model by
constructing national dyadic data from 32,007 negative events, 9,699,177 Twitter posts and
186,937 blog posts regarding constituents across 482 US-based MNEs in 48 host countries
during 2007 to 2014. We found that, in the social media world, social disapproval spills over
from home to host country quickly, is emotionally-charged, and provides great connectivity
among constituents in host countries. Moreover, when home and host countries experience
animosity, cross-border social disapproval occurs more quickly and emotionally. Additionally,
cross-border social disapproval is further strengthened when national animosity and hostcountry-nationalism are simultaneously strong. This study contributes to management research
by building a theory of cross-border social disapproval and identifying how it is mobilized in a
global context.
Keywords: cross-border social disapproval; social media coverage; national animosity;
nationalism
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Constituent grievances and their negative evaluations toward firms potentially undermine
firm performance and survival capability (Vergne, 2012; Xia et al., 2016). Therefore, these
topics have attracted considerable research attention in strategic management (e.g., Devers et al.,
2009; Xia et al., 2016; Zavyalova et al., 2017). Constituents are individuals who observe, assess,
and potentially interact with firms (Haack et al., 2014; Pollock et al., 2016). They often provide
the most authentic evaluations of firms; therefore, their perceptions impact organizational
outcomes, including financial performance, customer base loyalty, and resource acquisition
(Bundy & Pfarrer, 2015; Vergne, 2012; Zavyalova et al., 2012).
However, two important issues emerge from a careful review of prior literature on
constituents’ negative evaluations of firms. First, existing studies have exclusively focused on
the negative social evaluations generated in a single geographic region, mainly the United States
(US) (Vergne, 2012; Xia et al., 2016; Zavyalova et al., 2012). This research has yet to examine
the cross-border implications of negative social evaluations and has not considered the impact of
national differences, such as animosity and nationalism, which might exacerbate negative social
evaluations.
Understanding constituent perceptions about a multinational enterprise (MNE)’s
perspective is especially important because an MNE’s cross-national nature may result in
dissemination of disapproval on a global scale (Husted & Allen, 2007; Rugman & Verbeke,
2004; Tallman, 1992; Yu & Cannella, 2007). An MNE is “any enterprise that carries out
transactions in or between two sovereign entities […] where the transactions are subject to
influence by factors exogenous to the home country environment of the enterprise” (Sundaram &
Black, 1992: 733). Given the cross-national nature of an MNE, negative events occurring in
MNEs’ home countries have the potential to engender constituent disapproval globally. For

40

example, Mylan’s international constituents protested when the global pharmaceutical company
dramatically raised the EpiPen price in the US, even though they were not directly affected by
the price increases (Chester, 2016). Such examples serve as reminders that MNEs should pay
close attention to constituent grievances not only in home countries but also in host countries.
In addition to global scale, the cross-border context introduces complications for
multinationals that have not been studied by social evaluation researchers. Specifically, MNE’s
must contend with a diversity of constituents who may hold animosity to the MNE’s home
country and may feel national pride for their home countries. These complications likely affect
the nature of social disapproval in cross-border contexts in ways that do not affect within country
evaluations. These factors are especially germane given that national animosity and nationalism
appear to both be increasing as witnessed by events such as BREXIT, and many countries’
reaction to the refugee crisis (Postelnicescu, 2016). This lack of research attention is surprising,
given the majority of the world’s largest companies are MNEs that operate across national
boundaries (Rugman, 2004). International business scholars have called for more research on
MNEs’ organizational evaluations in their host countries (Rathert, 2016) since existing studies
mainly focus on home countries (e.g., Ioannou & Serafeim, 2012; Matten & Moon, 2008), and
even fewer have addressed the spillover effect from negative events at home to social evaluations
in host countries (e.g., Dube, Dube, & García-Ponce, 2013; Martynova & Renneboog, 2008).
This research is necessary because MNEs behave differently in host countries than in home
countries (Makino, Isobe, & Chan, 2004), host country constituents likely evaluate MNE actions
differently than home country constituents, and, thus, the research findings from home countries
cannot be generalized to host countries (Ioannou & Serafeim, 2012).
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Moreover, a second limitation of extant research on constituents’ negative evaluations of
firms is a focus primarily on the influence of traditional media, while minimal efforts have been
made to understand the influence of social media on social evaluations (Lamin & Zaheer, 2012;
Pollock & Rindova, 2003). Social media communications, which allow for almost instantaneous
sharing of information and evaluations about firms across borders, have become the major
platforms that constituents use to share their evaluation of firms. Not only is social media faster
at sharing negative events about firms, it also allows for more emotional evaluations and greater
connectivity among constituents across borders. Thus, by studying social media communication,
we can provide new theoretical insights that more closely align with how constituents
communicate in today’s globalized, social media world.
To address these issues, we first draw on Bundy and Pfarrer (2015)’s research about
social approval and define cross-border social disapproval as constituents’ general enmity toward
an MNE that spills over from a country to a global scale. For example, even after six years
following the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico, which only directly affected
constituents in North America, global constituents in general still dislike BP (RepRisk, April,
2010 to September, 2016). Building on our definition of cross-border social disapproval, we
address the following research question: How do three forces—social media coverage, national
animosity, and nationalism—mobilize social disapproval toward an MNE to accumulate across
national boundaries? Finally, to answer this question, we integrate two sets of theories, on
cognitive shortcuts and imprinting, with extant research on social evaluations and international
business.
After integrating cognitive shortcut and imprinting theories to develop our model of cross
border social disapproval, we test our model with a unique longitudinal dataset including 32,007
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negative events, which occurred in 482 US-based MNEs’ home country and have been
negatively evaluated by their constituents located in 48 different host countries such as China,
France, and Russia during 2007 to 2014. We also constructed a comprehensive social media
dataset by gathering 9,699,177 Twitter posts and 186,937 blog posts from 391,807 Twitter
accounts and 2,199 blog Uniform Resource Locators (URLs) belonging to host-countryconstituents. The results show that social media coverage of an MNE’s negative events in its
home country leads to quick, emotional, and connective social disapproval in its host countries.
We also found that cross-border social disapproval amplifies when home and host countries
experience animosity. National animosity refers to a “divergence of interests and opposing
actions” between countries (Arikan & Shenkar, 2013: 1517). Additionally, the increased
influence of animosity on cross-border social disapproval is further amplified when nationalism
is higher in the host country. Nationalism is a belief held by constituents that they ought to
contribute to their national symbols such as business, ethnic, status, and linguistic symbols
(Haas, 1986)
Our study provides three major contributions. First, we significantly advance social
evaluation research by developing new theory that accounts for cross-border social disapproval
in today’s social media world. Social media, which has rarely been studied in the management
literature, appears to be an increasingly impactful influence on the performance and potentially
even the survival of MNEs (Leonardi & Vaast, 2017). Second, this study contributes to
international business research by introducing the interactive influences of social media
coverage, national animosity, and nationalism to better understand cross-border disapproval.
Finally, the study advances behavioral strategy research on social evaluations of firms by
investigating cross-border social disapproval from the perspective of constituents’ cognition.
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CROSS-BORDER SOCIAL DISAPPROVAL: A SPILLOVER EFFECT FROM AN
MNE’S HOME TO HOST COUNTRIES
Cross-Border Social Disapproval
Negative spillover effects have been studied in the contexts of industries (e.g., toys,
chemical, and arms) and business policies (e.g., differences in bankruptcy filings) (Barnett &
King, 2008; Vergne, 2012; Xia et al., 2016; Zavyalova et al., 2012). As prior studies identified,
after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, arms manufacturers were collectively stigmatized as “sinful
firms” no matter the actual differences between firms in their social responsibility (Vergne,
2012). Likewise, following the Chicago Tylenol murders, other over-the-counter
pharmaceuticals lost 4.06 billion dollars even though their products had not been implicated
(Mitchell, 1989). In a similar sense, a firm reorganizing firm under Chapter 11 of US bankruptcy
law is often perceived as having a high risk of declaring insolvency by entering Chapter 7
regardless of its reorganizing capabilities (Xia et al., 2016).
In the same manner that spillover effects occur between organizations within an industry
or by employing similar business policies, we argue that negative spillover also occurs for an
MNE between events in its home country and social evaluations by constituents in their host
countries. In addition, we argue that constituents develop generalized evaluations of MNEs from
the same country, and these evaluations spill over to all MNEs from that country, regardless of
whether a firm conforms to the generalized evaluation or not. However, spillover effects have
been rarely addressed in the cross-national context. Considering existing research has yet to
focus on why cross-border social disapproval occurs, we develop a new theoretical framework
by drawing on social cognition and political sociology theories.
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Firstly, the social shortcuts literature provides hints that constituents may negatively
stereotype an MNE by retrieving the organization’s negative image in its home country and
applying it to the MNE’s evaluations in its host countries (Fiske & Taylor, 2013). We argue that
such stereotyping is largely facilitated by social media which efficiently deliver information
globally. The Toshiba accounting scandal in 2015 provides a typical example. This Japanesebased MNE has taken a serious hit in foreign markets after disclosing its financial fraud worth
two billion dollars at its Tokyo headquarters (Matthews & Gandel, 2015). As one of the
consequences of the negative spillover from an accounting scandal in its home country to host
country consumer evaluations about the value of its products, Toshiba was forced to stop making
TVs for many host countries, like the US, and eventually sold its TV division to a Hong Kongbased company, Skyworth (Becker, 2015).
In addition to making a cognitive shortcut from home country actions to generalize to
likely host country actions, cross-border constituents also generalize across MNEs from the same
country. Specifically, facing complex judgements in uncertain circumstances, such as the global
environment, boundedly rational constituents act as “satisfiers” who make adequate decisions
rather than “optimizers” who reach the optimal decisions (March & Simon, 1958). As part of this
satisficing process, constituents downplay individual differences between MNEs originating
from the same country, while emphasizing the similarities. Although MNEs from the same
country may behave quite differently, constituents may employ heuristics, or cognitive shortcuts,
which leads them to ignore the differences, instead perceiving that actions of MNEs from the
same home country are more cohesive than they are.
Secondly, political sociology suggests that national animosity and nationalistic attitudes
are imprinted in constituents’ sense-making and facilitate their heuristics to assume that the
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businesses originating from their enemy countries as generally unfavorable (Bar-Tal, 1997; Fiske
& Taylor, 2013). The recent mass boycotts in China targeting Japanese automobile manufactures
illustrate how imprinted hostility retrospective to the Sino-Japan wars diminishes constituent
approval toward Japanese-based MNEs and significantly shrank Japanese automotive sales in
China (Bradsher, 2012; Tan, 2017; Wei, 2012).
How constituents judged TATA Group provides a typical example of how cognitive
shortcuts and imprinting affect social evaluations in host countries. This Indian-based MNE has
long been world-renowned for manufacturing the world’s least expensive car, Nano, which also
fits the stereotype of Indian companies as manufacturers of inexpensive goods. However, TATA
also produces many other goods and services, some of which do not fit the low-cost stereotype.
TATA recently extended its automobile line to high-end automobile segments by acquiring Land
Rover and Jaguar, two high end nameplates. However, since Nano is one of the most dominant
products in TATA’s home country and its positioning fits the global stereotype for Indian
manufacturers, global constituents still perceive TATA as a cheap car maker. Additionally, India
and the United Kingdom (UK) have a complicated history of imperialistic rule with many
Indians also living today in the UK as nationalistic sentiments are rising in the UK leading to
growing animosity towards foreigners. Rather than helping increase the standing of TATA, the
acquisition hurt the evaluation of Land Rover and Jaguar, especially in the UK where these
nameplates are manufactured.
In summary, an MNE’s evaluation in its host countries is quite possibly quickly estimated
by heuristically referring to its image in its home country, which is colored by stereotypes of the
home country, because implementing such heuristics allows constituents to interpret “cognitively
complex information” more easily and simplifies judgement (Khaire & Wadhwani, 2010: 1282).
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Its multinational nature provides a context to study how social disapproval spills over from home
to host countries, mobilized by social media coverage, animosity, and nationalism mobilize
social disapproval across national boundaries. Figure 2.1 presents the theoretical model and
summarizes the hypotheses of cross-border social disapproval.
---------------------------------Insert Figure 2.1 about here
---------------------------------Social Media Coverage as a Mobilization
We predict social media coverage—constituent-generated content via Twitter and online
blogs (Van Dijck, 2009)—can mobilize cross-border social disapproval. Specifically, drawing on
theories of cognitive shortcuts, we argue that social media coverage of an MNE’s negative
events in its home country increases three dimensions of cross-border social disapproval:
velocity, emotionality, and communality, which respectively are defined as how quickly,
affectively, and connectively host-country constituents generate enmity toward an MNE.
Velocity of cross-border social disapproval and availability heuristics. Velocity of
cross-border social disapproval refers to the speed that host-country constituents generate enmity
toward an MNE after they learn about the MNE’s negative events in its home country. Without
journalists as information gatekeepers (Coombs, 2009), social media provide immediate
information exchanges between an MNE’s host and home countries. Such rapid information
exchanges facilitate constituents’ availability heuristics, which evaluate “an event’s likelihood
based on how quickly instances come to mind” (Fiske & Taylor, 2013: 182). Specifically, if
constituents have no difficulty quickly retrieving a scenario in memory, for example, by the help
of social media, they tend to overestimate its likelihood of occurring; otherwise, if it takes a
while for them to search information cues, they will scale down their estimation of an event’s
likelihood (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). For example, through YouTube, Europeans rapidly
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heard about pizza contamination of Domino’s in the US and then their availability heuristics
drove them to quickly stereotype Domino’s as an undesirable firm also in Europe (Aula &
Heinonen, 2015). In other words, because of the rapid information exchanges via social media
and constituents’ availability heuristics, host-country constituents may quickly disapprove of an
MNE.
Emotionality of cross-border social disapproval and simulation heuristics.
Emotionality of cross-border social disapproval denotes the amount of emotion host-country
constituents generate toward an MNE after they learn of the organization’s negative events
occurring in its home country. Social media include a larger number of affective expressions and
therefore allow constituents to easily imagine that a similar undesirable scenario may happen to
themselves (Choi & Lin, 2009). This phenomenon, defined as simulation heuristics, means
constituents can easily imagine a frustrating situation that may occur in their own life
(Kahneman, 1982). For instance, after reading the Twitter posts from EpiPen protestors,
worldwide constituents exhibited extremely negative emotions toward the US-based
pharmaceutical MNE because they can easily imagine how frustrated they could be if their
family suffered severe allergic reactions without affordable EpiPen products. In this sense,
constituents from host countries may generate social disapproval with more emotionality because
the extremely negative affective sentiments that are carried by social media facilitate simulation
heuristics and allow them to easily imagine the undesirable scenarios also affecting them, even if
they are unaffected by the events.
Communality of cross-border social disapproval and representativeness heuristics.
Communality of cross-border social disapproval is the level to which host-country constituents
are connected—in both empathetic and supportive manners—to home-country constituents due
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to shared grievances (Goodwin, 1996; Haythornthwaite, 2005). Linking 7.395 billion
constituents globally (Chaffey, 2017), social media provide constituents great opportunities to
share grievances. Although various opinions exist among constituents, they tend to ignore
divergent portrayals and frame their judgment based on common portrayals in order to reinforce
their stereotypes (Fiske & Taylor, 2013). This phenomenon can be explained by
representativeness heuristics, which refer to stereotypes that allow a specific scenario to fit
within common portrayals (Kahneman & Tversky, 1972). These stereotypes likely have stronger
effects in host countries when the negative actions occur by a firm against its home-country
constituents due to outgroup bias which shows a preference to treat members of the same group
(the ingroup) better than outsiders (the outgroup; Fiske & Taylor, 2013). For example, foreign
passengers are more likely to believe that United Airlines would not offer satisfactory customer
services when millions of negative comments about the YouTube video United Breaks Guitars,
an negative event happened in the US (Tripp & Grégoire, 2011), than they are to harbor such
beliefs if a similar incident had occurred with their home country airline. In other words, if an
MNE’s negative actions adversely affects its home country constituents (i.e., the MNE’s
ingroup), host country constituents will assume that it will also act at least that negatively toward
them (i.e., the MNE’s outgroup), even if the MNE has not, and greater social disapproval will
result.
Taken together, based on the argument of availability, simulation, and representativeness
heuristics, we propose social media coverage plays a significant role in mobilizing cross-border
social disapproval with high levels of velocity, emotionality, and communality. Hence, we
hypothesize:
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Hypothesis 1 (H1): The more social media coverage of an MNE’s negative events is in its
home country, the greater the (H1a) velocity, (H1b) emotionality, and (H1c) communality
of cross-border social disapproval will be.
The Amplifying Effect of National Animosity
History is fraught with national animosity that has manifested in different patterns,
including political antagonism, armed conflicts, and military confrontation. Animosity is not
easily forgotten; instead, it is imprinted in constituents’ cognition after countries experience
frequent and aggravated animosity (Bar-Tal, 1997). National animosity also transmits the
resentment to new generations, who continue to dislike the businesses originating from
unfavorable nations (Bar-Tal, 1997). For example, during the 1990s, a social survey was
conducted in Nanjing (Klein, Ettenson, & Morris, 1998), a Chinese city where the Japanese
Fascist army murdered about 300,000 citizens in a 1937 massacre and captured more than 20,000
women as sex slaves for Japanese soldiers during the Sino-Japanese wars (Fogel, 2000).
Although five decades had passed since this Japanese-led massacre, results of the survey
indicated that the overwhelming majority of Chinese still exhibited rancor toward Japanese firms
and brands (Klein et al., 1998). In other words, animosity has “a cumulative impact over time on
the present nature of intergroup relations” (Bar-Tal, 1997: 496).
Moreover, animosity serves as a passive “psychological impact” and disrupts “the
exchange and ongoing relationships” among multinational businesses (Weber & Mayer, 2011:
69). Specifically, animosity toward a nation enhances MNEs’ economic risks such as
opportunism, untrustworthy commitments, and transaction costs; it also increases difficulty in
accessing resources, decreases international trade, and thwarts international integrations
(Anderton & Carter, 2001; Arikan & Shenkar, 2013; Barbieri & Levy, 1999). For instance, with

50

great national animosity following the Persian Gulf War, constituents from each belligerent
country intensified their support of domestic firms and disapproval of businesses associated with
enemy countries (Pan & Kosicki, 1994). In this sense, the marketing literature suggests that
MNEs originating in a home country whose military history is controversial should consider the
levels of animosity that foreign customers exhibit toward the home countries (Klein et al., 1998).
Below, we build on these insights from social cognition literatures to explain how national
animosity reinforces social media’s influence on cross-border social disapproval.
National animosity strengthens social media’s impact on velocity. National animosity
enhances the influence of social media on the velocity of cross-border social disapproval.
According to the psychology of prejudice (Brewer, 1999), animosity is a salient force increasing
a type of availability heuristic—national stereotypes, which automatically bias constituents’
understanding of media information. Specifically, when host and home countries experience
animosity, host-country constituents are more likely to believe that the unfavorable media
portrayals about an MNE’s negative events in its home country are more valid. For instance,
when Indians and Pakistanis are asked to evaluate firms originating from the opposite country,
the hostility under the shadow of long-term territorial disputes about the Kashmir area will be
automatically activated and biases their understanding of media coverage (Bremmer, 2016).
Therefore, when national animosity is higher, constituents will more quickly agree that the
negative media coverage is representative of an MNE based on their unfavorable home country
and thus more unfavorably judge the MNE.
National animosity strengthens social media’s impact on emotionality. National
animosity strengthens the emotionality of cross-border social disapproval led by social media
coverage. According to intergroup emotion theory (Mackie et al., 2000), constituents perceive
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threats, both realistic (e.g., social welfare and nature resources) and symbolic (e.g., political
views and social norms) in nature, from the media communication about their unfavorable
countries (Schemer, 2012). Therefore, media coverage of MNEs from an unfavorable country
will generate more negative emotions than the media coverage about firms from a favorable
country. For instance, following a large amount of news about the Diesel Dupe scandal in 2015,
the Germany-based MNE Volkswagen quickly experienced a large sales drop in the rest of the
European Union, while achieving a four percent sales increase in China (Reuters, 2016). The
sales drop was probably because Germany was seen as the “most-hated” country by many other
European Union members (MacDonald, 2015:1). On the other hand, more than 40 years of SinoGerman cooperation was only getting stronger (Tiezzi, 2014; von Hein, 2012). Because of the
already established hostility, host-country constituents’ emotions are more likely to align with
the negative social media coverage (Schemer, 2012) and constituents are prone to frame their
simulation heuristics regarding “a hypothetical scenario” (Fiske & Taylor, 2013: 179) that
negative media reports of MNEs based in their enemy country are generally believable and likely
are indicative of how the MNE will treat them as well.
National animosity strengthens social media’s impact on communality. National
animosity increases the positive relationship between social media coverage and communality of
cross-border social disapproval. National animosity frames constituents’ collective identity of
their nationhood (Slater, 2015: 385). When fundamental ideologies between two countries are
not in line, constituents tend to reinforce their own beliefs of negative media coverage about
unfavorable countries and more connectively against the MNEs from those countries. This
phenomenon is called “ingroup love or outgroup hate,” meaning constituents are more likely to
believe the negative information and less likely to patronize the businesses originating from
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countries they view unfavorably (Brewer, 1999: 429). For instance, after the Cold War, 71
percent of Russian respondents felt general enmity toward the US (The Moscow Times, 2016);
negative media reports from both sides have been overemphasized due to the mutual hostility
(Koshkin, 2016). Therefore, both Russian and American constituents have strengthened their
disapproval of each other’s MNEs (Armstrong, 2016). Accordingly, when national animosity is
high, social media coverage of an MNE’s negative event is more likely to increase the
communality of cross-border social disapproval.
Taking these arguments together, national animosity strengthens constituents’ negative
stereotypes of MNEs originating from enemy countries and thus hastens cross-border social
disapproval. In other words, the relationship specified in Hypotheses 1 strengthens if an MNE’s
home country and its host country have experienced animosity with higher frequency. Hence, we
hypothesize:
Hypothesis 2 (H2): The greater the animosity is between host and home countries, the
stronger the impact of social media coverage on the (H2a) velocity, (H2b) emotionality,
and (H2c) communality of cross-border social disapproval will be.
Nationalism Amplifies Cross-Border Social Disapproval
Next, we argue that nationalism also contributes to cross-border social disapproval
because it strengthens constituents’ identification with their own countries (Smith & Smith,
2013). Nationalism is constituents’ belief that they ought to support their national symbols
(Haas, 1986). For example, the US is often ranked as one of the nations with high nationalism
(cf., surveys conducted by University of Chicago’s National Opinion Research Center). An
online campaign called American Made Matters (2010) involved a large number of Americans
signing a pledge to buy domestic products. Meanwhile, Walmart is frequently boycotted by
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American constituents for its reliance on imports from China (Isidore, 2015). In this sense,
nationalism enables constituents to assemble a “self-conscious group” on behalf of their own
nation (Haas, 1986; Simon & Klandermans, 2001: 319). In other words, nationalism is an ingroup identification toward domestic business because nationalistic constituents tend to believe
“our gains come at another nation’s expense, and theirs come at ours” (Reich, 2001: 1).
We argue that nationalism indirectly enhances the influence of negative media coverage
on cross-border social disapproval by means of national animosity, instead of directly
moderating the relationship between social media coverage and cross-border social disapproval.
It is because “in-group identification leads to negative outgroup attitudes only when the outgroup poses a threat to the in-group” (Skitka, 2005: 1997). In other words, cross-border social
disapproval may not be a consequence of negative media coverage without another country
being perceived to pose a threat to the ingroup. For example, although Israel exhibits high
nationalism, Israeli constituents have less social disapproval toward the US-based MNEs (Oren,
2008); it might be because Israelis feel less threats from the US. In contrast, the Iranian
constituents who also have great nationalism show more social disapproval toward the US-based
MNEs due to the animosity between Iran and the US (Little, 2011). In these examples, it is clear
to see when nationalism is coupled with national animosity, constituents increase their
disapproval of MNEs originating from their disfavored countries (Pan & Kosicki, 1994).
With strong nationalistic attitudes in a host country and simultaneously great animosity
between host and home countries, constituents from host country have a biased understanding of
the media coverage from home country due to out-group stereotypes. For example, due to ArabAmerican animosity, constituents on both sides tend to believe the opposite nation is inferior to
their own country (Ayub & Jehn, 2006) and thus generate out-group stereotypes by focusing on
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negative information from the opposite nation and ignoring positive information (Bhappu,
Griffith, & Northcraft, 1997). Especially when nationalism put additional strain on ArabAmerican animosity, constituents are even more likely to believe that the negative social media
portrayals from opposite countries are more valid, and the positive media statements from
opposite countries are unreliable (Bremmer, 2016). Therefore, nationalism amplifies the
moderating effect of national animosity on the relationship between social media coverage and
cross-border social disapproval.
Taken together, when host-country constituents immerse themselves in nationalism, they
are more prone to support the firms representing their own national identity, and more likely to
disapprove of MNEs originating from other nations, especially those deemed to be enemies. In
other words, the relationship specified in Hypothesis 2 strengthens when an MNE’s host country
experiences greater nationalism. Hence, we hypothesize:
Hypothesis 3 (H3): The greater the nationalism is in the host country, the greater that
national animosity amplifies the positive relationship between social media coverage and
cross-border social disapproval in terms of (H3a) velocity, (H3b) emotionality, and
(H3c) communality.
DATA AND METHODS
Unit of Analysis
The unit of analysis in this study is firm-event-national dyad. For example, one
observation is the German reaction to General Motors (GM)’s vehicle ignition switch problems
in the US (Isidore, 2014). In the dyadic level data, the home country (i.e., the US) pairs with all
its host countries for each firm-event observation. Suppose a US-based multinational firm named
A has overseas ownership in the three host countries of China, India, and Japan in 2016, then we
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generated three dyads: US-China, US-India, and US-Japan dyads all for the firm A in an
observation year.
Sample Verification and Study Period
The MNE samples were verified by major overseas ownership, which is indicated by the
Security Data Corporation (SDC) Platinum’s Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) and Joint
Venture (JV) databases (Huizinga & Voget, 2009; Xia, 2011). Following prior practice, we used
an 80% cut-off to define an MNE’s major oversea ownership (Li, Xia, & Lin, 2017; Makino &
Beamish, 1998).
SDC databases include domestic and cross-border mergers, acquisitions, and joint
ventures drawing on news sources worldwide, SEC filings and their international counterparts,
trade publications, wires and investment banks, and law firms (SDC, 1999). Given some MNEs
may withdraw from their overseas ownership in the long term (Krug & Hegarty, 2001), we
observed MNEs in a year right after their deals obtaining overseas ownership (Xia, 2011; Li et
al., 2017). For example, if firm A had an effective cross-border deal in 2010, then we observe
firm A as multinational in 2011. Thus, we collected cross-border deals during 2006 to 2013 in
SDC and observed MNEs during 2007 to 2014, the immediate next years following the deals.
Our observations start from 2007, the milestone year of the social media era given both Twitter
and Facebook were opened to the public in 2006 and social media usage grew rapidly beginning
in 2007. Our sample collection ends at 2014 given a series of national animosity indices—
International Crisis Behavior Projects (ICB)—were updated until 2013 (Brecher, Wilkenfeld,
Beardsley, James, & Quinn, 2016), and the variable drawn from these indices is lagged by one
year compared to our dependent variables.
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Sample Selection
Sample selection takes three steps. First, we collected cross-border deals from the SDC
M&A and JV databases (Xia, 2011). After cleaning duplicated and missing values, we generated
65,050 MNE-national dyad observations from the SDC M&A database and 5,202 such
observations from the SDC JV database. We also searched these observations in Thomson
Reuters Worldscope (Worldscope) and Compustat databases because we needed financial data
relating to our observations. Worldscope and Compustat are the commonly-used and
authoritative databases covering financial information of MNEs (Guenther & Rosman, 1994;
Thomson Reuters Worldscope, 2016).
Second, we matched these observations to RavenPack News Analytics database
(RavenPack) to gather negative events conducted by MNEs and time stamps that these events
were reported initially. RavenPack is an emerging database for news analytics, which is housed
by the University of Pennsylvania’s Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS). Research based
on RavenPack data has begun to appear in top tier journals, attesting to the reliability and
comprehensiveness of this database (Connelly, Tihanyi, Ketchen, Carnes, & Ferrier, 2017; Dai,
2012; Dang, Moshirian, & Zhang, 2015). This process yielded 357,110 negative events
conducted by 1,150 US-based MNEs during 2007 to 2014.
Finally, we searched constituents’ tweets and blog posts because we need to ensure
constituents had social media posts regarding the MNEs and their negative events. We used @
sign and time stamps to gather the relevant Twitter posts that called out and mentioned those
MNEs following those negative events we collected (Twitter, 2017). For example, we searched
all the constituents’ tweets that mentioned GM (i.e., @GM: https://twitter.com/gm) on time
stamps after GM’s vehicle ignition switch incident was announced to constituents. To collect the
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relevant blog posts, we searched the topic firms and time stamps structured by the RavenRack
database. This matching process ultimately yielded our final samples, including 32,007 firmevent-national dyad observations from 482 US-based MNEs, and 48 host countries during 2007
to 2014.
Collection of Social Media Posts
We purchased and crawled raw tweets that were generated by both home and hostcountry-constituents from the Twitter Company. We provided the Twitter Company with datamining queries to pull constituents’ tweets regarding our study’s sample firms and time periods.
To collect constituent perceptions from different countries, the constituents’ geographic locations
were identified from Twitter user profiles. Twitter data have become the most authoritative data
sources for social media research (Hewett et al., 2016) because Twitter is the most popular social
media network worldwide involving more than two billion active users (Statista, 2016b).
We also collected additional social media data from blogs from RavenPack database,
which includes all blog posts from 19,000 blog URLs globally (RavenPack News Analytics,
2016). We believe blog posts are the necessary supplement to tweets for three reasons. First, in
some important host countries, such as China, Twitter usage is officially censored, and therefore,
communication via blogs have significant influence on constituents’ evaluations toward firms
(Luo et al., 2016). Second, many professional constituents such as institutional investors and
security analysts, may rely more on blogs than tweets in forming their evaluations of MNEs
(Hewett et al., 2016). Finally, Twitter and blog communications complement each other
especially before Twitter became dominant in 2012, the year that Twitter reached 100 million
users and 340 million posts per day (Twitter, March 21, 2012).
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To gather the blog content purely generated by constituents, we matched each blog to its
parent media agency using the Parent ID in RavenPack and excluded blogs related to any
traditional media agencies. For example, we excluded the Speakeasy blog
(http://blogs.wsj.com/speakeasy/) because it belongs to the Wall Street Journal. The process
generated 15,267 non-media owned blog URLs. Then, to check that the blog posts under each
URL were written by constituents, rather than journalists, two research assistants read 200 URLs
randomly sampled from the 15,267 URLs we identified. Both reported that 100% of the 200
randomly sampled blogs were written by constituents.
To identify blog location, we analyzed the geographic distributions of all blog posts in
RavenPack. Because 90.76% of blog URLs most frequently talked about US-based firms, we
used the blog posts under those URLs to collect the negative events that happened in the home
country of the US-based MNEs (i.e., the US). For the rest of URLs (i.e., 9.24% that most
frequently talked about firms outside of the US), we analyzed the geographic distributions (i.e.,
the top three nations) of their blog posts to determine the primary authorship nation.
Dependent Variables: Velocity, Emotionality, and Communality of Cross-Border Social
Disapproval
Because the measurement of social disapproval is still under-developed, we borrowed an
emerging R-squared (R2) method from current publications in top tier finance journals (Dang et
al., 2015; Morck, Yeung, & Yu, 2013) and applied the method to measure the accumulation of
social disapproval. Specifically, to capture cross-border social disapproval, we measured how a
negative event’s news sentiment in a home country drives the social level sentiment from hostcountry constituents. We used three types of sentiment scores: event sentiment scores (ESS),
Twitter sentiment scores (TSS), and composite sentiment Scores (CSS).
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ESS are provided by RavenPack. These sentiment scores indicate the influence of those
negative events occurred in the home country (i.e., in our sample, the US). ESS shows “how
firm-specific news events are categorized and rated as having a positive or negative effect on
stock prices by experts with extensive experience and backgrounds in linguistics, finance, and
economics” (Dang et al., 2015: 86).
We constructed TSS by using raw tweets following prior literature (Go, Huang, &
Bhayani, 2009; Hewett et al., 2016). Specifically, we disambiguated the misspelling,
abbreviations, and special characters in raw tweets to generate the analyzable Twitter text. Then
we used a standard Twitter sentiment analysis tool to score each tweet as the level sentiment,
ranging from highly positive to highly negative (Nielsen, 2011).
CSS are also provided by RavenPack, which indicates host-country-constituents’
integrated perceptions across stakeholder groups. CSS combines perceptions across stakeholder
groups, i.e., business partners (BAM), shareholders (BEE), editors (BMQ), and journalists
(PEQ). CSS “is determined by looking at emotionally charged words and phrases and by
matching stories typically rated by experts as having short-term positive or negative share price
impact” (RavenPack News Analytics, 2016: 19).
We scaled ESS, TSS, and CSS as consecutive numbers ranging from -10 (most negative)
to 10 (most positive). Following prior work using social media data (Hewett et al., 2016), we
structured 9,699,177 tweets and 186,937 blog posts to a weekly base (see Exhibit a). We
included 8 weeks after an event was initially reported in our analysis to capture, a long enough
period to show the accumulation process of cross-border social disapproval.
Firm i

CSSi1
TSSi1

Breaking news of a
trigger negative event

Week 1

CSSi2
TSSi2

Week 2

CSSi3
TSSi3

Week 3

CSSi4
TSSi4

Week 4

CSSi5
TSSi5

CSSiX
TSSix
Week 5
... Week 8

(a)
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Then we used the R2 method from economics and finance research to calculate the
synchronicity between two trends (Dang et al., 2015; Morck et al., 2013). We ran the regression
Equation (1) for a group of data gathered based on each event-firm-week group (see Equation 1).

TSS j ,i ,t  CSS j ,i ,t  a j ,i ,t   j ,i ,t ESS j ,i ,t   j ,i ,t

(1)

where j, i and t denote event j, firm i and week t.
Thereby, we generated eight R2 values for event j and MNE i from the 1st week to the 8th
week following a breaking news of the event j. In the process, we generated 256,056 R2 values in
total (32,007 events x 8 weeks), and then selected the maximum R2 value for each event, which
represents the maximum level of social disapproval in a host country following a negative event
in a home country.
Velocity of cross-border social disapproval accumulation was calculated by how many
weeks it took R2 values reach the maximum for each event. Thus, the fewer the number of weeks
was reached, the greater the velocity.
Emotionality of cross-border social disapproval accumulation was measured by sentiment
( TSS j ,i ,t  CSS j ,i ,t ) generated by host-country-constituents in the week when R2 values reach the
maximum. The sentiment scores represent the social-level emotions driven by the negative
events.
Communality of cross-border social disapproval was measured by the total number of
host-country-constituents who wrote about an MNE during the time window from a negative
event occurred to R2 values reached the maximum for each event.
Independent Variables: Social Media Coverage, National Animosity, and Nationalism
Social media coverage was measured by the number of tweets and blog posts in the home
country (i.e., the US) that covered a negative event conducted by an MNE in the US. As with the

61

international sample, Tweets and blog posts were collected in a time window (i.e., the
Coordinated Universal Time) from the day when the negative event was initially reported ending
when the R2 for this event reached maximum value. This variable was log-transformed.
To measure national animosity, we collected 11 national indices from the perspectives of
economic, military, people, and political/government (see Table 1). Nes, Yelkur, and Silkoset
(2012)’s qualitative interviews identified these four dimensions and items in each dimension. For
example, an item in the economic dimension is the about illegal immigrants from one country
taking jobs in another country (Nes et al., 2012). For this item, we created an index to measure
refugee population by country from the World Bank databases. Moreover, Nes et al. (2012)
identified an item in the military dimension is whether two countries fought against each in a
war. To quantitatively measure this item, we gathered data from the International ICB and
UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset. Considering the “social memory” effect of animosity
(Zavyalova et al., 2012: 1088), we included a decay measure that assigns the weight of 1/n for
each year when a conflict occurred prior to the year of our observation, and then added all
decayed conflicts together (Soda, Usai, & Zaheer, 2004; Zavyalova et al., 2012). For example,
suppose nations X and Y were recorded for five different conflicts that occurred in 1949, 1950,
1955, 1961 and 1962. Then, for an MNE observation of X and Y national dyad in 2007, we
measured this aspect of animosity as the following:
1/(2007-1949)+1/(2007-1950)+1/(2007-1955)+1/(2007-1961)+1/(2007-1962)
=1/58+1/57+1/52+1/46+1/45
---------------------------------Insert Table 2.1 about here
---------------------------------To construct the nationalism variable, we did a principal factor analysis on these 11
indices, and selected 10 main indices which loaded on a common factor and together account for
more than 90% of the variance in the data (Xia, 2011). The results of principal factor analysis
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suggested us to exclude the linguistic proximity from variable construction (see the No. 8 index
in Table 1). Finally, those 10 indices were aggregated into a national dyadic level using
Euclidean distance method (see Xia, 2011 for methods in detail). Constructing a single variable
measurement using multiple indices has been recommended for strategic research (Boyd, Gove,
& Hitt, 2005).
To measure nationalism in host countries, we collected the State Identity index from the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) database, which is an
widely used dataset for cross-national comparisons (Duso & Röller, 2003; Reinhardt, Hussey, &
Anderson, 2002). State Identity index indicates the levels that national citizens agree about their
belonging to the citizenship and accept their national-state as legitimate (Ashizawa, 2008;
Kaplan, 1994). We also complemented the State Identity index data with the World’s Most and
Least Patriotic Countries data released by Forbes.
Control Variables
At the firm level, we controlled for a multinational firm’s size (i.e., total assets) and
performance (i.e., return on assets). A large organization with better performance can usually
accumulate more intangible assets (Delios & Beamish, 2001). Organizational performance
largely affects a multinational firm’s further performance (Lang, Stulz, & Walkling, 1989).
These financial variables were collected from Worldscope and Compustat. Moreover, we
controlled for MNEs’ historical reputation in foreign markets because it affects organizational
outcomes in the multinational context. We measured such reputation using the US-based MNE’s
charitable giving outside of the US by collecting the data from the MSCI ESG KLD STATS
(MSCI) database (Attig, El Ghoul, Guedhami, & Suh, 2013). This is a dummy variable coded as
1 by MSCI in a year when a firm “make at least 20% of its giving, or have taken notably
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innovative initiatives in its giving program, outside the U.S.” (MSCI ESG Research Inc., 2015:
55), and 0 otherwise.
At the event level, we controlled for the topics of negative events (i.e., business=1 and
society=0 following RavenPack’s categorization) because different topics of negative events
might have different media coverage and influence on social disapproval (Yang, Kang, &
Johnson, 2010).
At the national level, political stability in host countries was controlled by using the
OECD political stability index because it often influences the institutional environment and
international investment of multinational firms (Henisz, 2000, 2002). Moreover, we controlled
for cultural distance between home and host countries using Hofstede (1980)’s national culture
dimensions: 1) collectivism/individualism, 2) power distance, 3) masculinity/femininity, 4)
uncertainty avoidance, and 5) long/short term orientation. Hofstede’s culture dimensions have
been widely used in international business research (Kogut & Singh, 1988). Based on Kogut and
Singh (1988), we built the following method to calculate cultural distance :
5

CD j ,k   {(I i , j  I k , j ) 2 / Vi } / 5
i

where CD j ,k denote culture distance between nation j and nation k; 5 means the five
dimensions developed by Hofstede (1980); I i , j and I i ,k stands for the dimension i in countries j
and k; Vi is the variance of the index in the dimension i.
Moreover, we fixed industry effect given some industries, such as airline, retail, and
consumer products have high visibility on social media (Anderson, Sims, Price, & Brusa, 2011).
We also fixed year effect to control any influence varied by years. All time-variant controls are
lagged by one year compared to our dependent variables to capture longitudinal predictions
(Pozo, 1992).
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Estimation Methods
We used the Generalized Linear Models (GLM), which fit to our research because our
dependent variables—velocity, emotionality, and communality of social disapproval are not
normally distributed, and GLM do not require the researcher to transform dependent variables to
a normal distribution (Wooldridge, 2000).
RESULTS
Table 2.2 presents the means, standard deviations, and correlations of our variables.
Multicollinearity is not a concern in our models through VIF tests (Kutner, Nachtsheim, & Neter,
2004). To construct interaction terms, we mean-centered independent variables to reduce the
influence of different scales (Aiken & West, 1991; Tsai, 2001).
Table 2.3 presents the results of GLM regressions predicting velocity, emotionality, and
communality of social disapproval accumulation in host countries. Models 1, 5, and 9 only
include control variables. Models 2, 6, 10 add home countries’ social media coverage as an
independent variable to test hypothesized direct effects. Model 3, 7, and 11 add two-way
interactions between social media coverage and animosity. Model 4, 8 and 12 test three-way
interactions among social media coverage, animosity, and nationalism.
-------------------------------------------Insert Tables 2.2 and 2.3 about here
--------------------------------------------Hypotheses 1a-1c assert that social media coverage of MNE negative events in the home
country (in our sample, the US) will generate social disapproval with great velocity, negative
emotions, and high community in host countries. Through Model 2, 6, and 10 (β=-0.033,
p<0.001; β=-0.002, p<0.01; β=0.316, p<0.05), we found support to these hypotheses. Regarding
the effect size based on the non-log-transformation of social media coverage, about 100
additional social media posts in a home country can speed the accumulation of social disapproval
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by two and a half days. Likewise, almost 1,000 extra media posts in a home country can reduce
constituents’ emotionality by 0.1 level from a scale range from -10 (most negative) to +10 (most
positive). Moreover, roughly 100 additional social media posts in a home country would attract
three more constituent from a host country to join the disapproval communality against an MNE.
According to these results, we found the significant power of social media coverage in
mobilizing cross-border social disapproval quickly, emotionally, and connectively.
We also found significant results for two of the three hypothesized interactions between
social media coverage and national animosity. As Hypotheses 2a-2c predicted, national
animosity will amplify social media coverage’s impact on cross-border social disapproval.
Models 3 and 7 (β=-0.012, p<0.001; β=-0.005, p<0.001) supported Hypotheses 2a and 2b. As
indicated by Figure 2.2a, when animosity between the host and home country is higher, the
number of weeks for social disapproval to accumulate is significantly reduced. Likewise, Figure
2.2b shows that host-country-constituents’ emotions become prominently negative when home
and host countries experience greater animosity.
----------------------------------Insert Figure 2.2 about here
----------------------------------However, Hypothesis 2c was not significantly supported by Model 11 (β=0.061, p>0.1)
although the direction is consistent with our prediction. In other words, animosity has no
significant amplifying effect on the relationship between social media coverage and the
communality of cross-border social disapproval. Social psychology research on nationalism (e.g.,
Skitka, 2005) may explain the reason. Specifically, to make constituents connectively dislike an
out-group, they should not only feel threats from an out-group, but also they must feel a strong
in-group identity. At the national level, nationalism typically builds constituents’ in-group
identity against their enemy nations (Haas, 1986). We further explored whether nationalism,
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animosity and media coverage interactively drive communality in the following three-way
interactions.
We tested hypotheses 3a-3c with three-way interactions among social media coverage,
animosity, and nationalism. Hypothesis 3a was not supported by Model 4 because the coefficient
is in the opposite direction than we predicted (β=0.007). We speculate the opposite direction may
indicate that constituents with great nationalism are more quickly attracted by their home nation
stories rather than foreign country news. Hypotheses 3b and 3c were supported by Models 8 and
12 (β=-0.002, p<0.001; β=0.734, p<0.001), which show that high nationalism further increases
the amplifying effect of high animosity on the relationship between social media coverage and
social disapproval regarding emotionality and communality. As depicted in Figure 2.4, when
nationalism is high, animosity drives more negative emotions. Likewise, Figures 2.5 indicates
that the great animosity paired by high nationalism involve more constituents to disapprove an
MNE.
--------------------------------------------------Insert Figures 2.3, 2.4, and 2.5 about here
----------------------------------------------------

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Theoretical Contributions
Our study built a theoretical framework and empirically examined cross-border social
disapproval, which are increasing in importance for MNE success, but have been rarely
addressed in previous management research. This lack of prior research is surprising, given the
majority of the world’s largest companies are multinationals that produce and distribute products
across national boundaries (Rugman, 2004). Recent political events such as BREXIT, other
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elections in Europe and the US suggest that national animosity and nationalism are both on the
rise. There is a need to understand how these factors affect MNEs.
Similarly, prior research of social evaluations has rarely examined cross border effects
(e.g., Barnett & King, 2008; Vergne, 2012; Xia et al., 2016; Zavyalova et al., 2012). The
increasing use of social and other on-line based media allows constituents across the globe to
learn about the transgressions by MNEs that operate within their country’s borders. Yet, we
know little about how negative events in one part of the world effect the evaluations by
constituents in other parts of the world. Our study adds to social evaluation literature by
providing a theoretical and empirical investigation of how social disapproval accumulates across
national boundaries. Therefore, our study enriches management research by introducing and
investigating cross-border social disapproval.
Our results advance international business research by investigating the influence of
animosity between host and home countries and nationalism in host countries. International
business scholars have called for more research to address host country effects (Rathert, 2016).
Fewer studies have addressed the host-home country relationship (e.g., Dube et al., 2013;
Martynova & Renneboog, 2008) than the studies about home country effect (e.g., Ioannou &
Serafeim, 2012; Matten & Moon, 2008). This line of research is necessary because host and
home country constituents evaluate firms differently such that previous research findings from
home countries may not be generalized to host countries. Therefore, our study moved forward
international business research by specifying the effect of host country situation on cross-border
social disapproval.
Additionally, we contribute to behavioral strategy research by investigating cross-border
social disapproval from a cognitive perspective (Fiske & Taylor, 2013). Drawing on social
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cognitive theory, we suggested that constituents-generated content (i.e., social media coverage),
national animosity, and nationalistic attitudes are usually imprinted in constituents’ cognition and
bias their sense-making of the business from opponent country. It is an important theoretical
extension given prior research about this research issue merely focused on journalist-generated
content (i.e., traditional media coverage) (Zavyalova et al., 2012) and macro explanation based
on political science (Arikan & Shenkar, 2013). Therefore, our research advanced behavioral
strategy by emphasizing the influence of social media communication and constituent cognition.
Practical Implications
Our findings have practical implications for multinational organizations. These
organizations should look outward toward their host countries when building a worldwide social
approval. In the age of social media, information asymmetry has been largely reduced; therefore,
it is impossible for a multinational organization to hide its negative events from foreign
constituents. As a result, MNEs should understand why social disapproval accumulates in the
foreign markets following its negative events that occurred in its home country. Our study
suggests multinational firms monitor social media coverage, national animosity between home
and host countries, and nationalistic attitudes in host counties and develop proactive strategies to
neutralize the effects of these factors following negative events.
Limitations and Further Research Directions
Two possible limitations may affect the results of this study. First, our social media data
did not include pictures and audios (e.g., YouTube videos, Facebook pictures, Instagram
photographs). Although research merely using the social media text (e.g., tweets and blogs) has
been legitimated in top-tier business journals (Hewett et al., 2016; Luo et al., 2016; Ma et al.,
2015), we encourage further research to use the audio and visual materials on social media. It is
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because visual materials are able to capture emotional content using unobtrusive measures
(Balconi & Vanutelli, 2016), which will add robustness on our results. Second, our theoretical
framework mainly focused on social cognition perspective. We encourage further research to
enrich our understanding of cross-border social disapproval by extending to more theoretical
perspectives.
In conclusion, we developed a deep understanding of the roles of social media, national
animosity, and nationalism in mobilizing cross-border social disapproval. This study also
introduced an innovative perspective to strategic management research to understand the topic of
social disapproval.
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APPENDIX
Table 2. 1. Indices, Dimensions and Measurements of National Animosity
Categories of
animosity
(Nes et al., 2012)
Economic

No. Statements
(Nes et al., 2012)

Quantitative
measurement

Data source (in national
dyad or national distance)

1

Poverty

World Bank

Economic

2

Military

3

Military

4

Illegal immigrants
from this country
taking our jobs
Nuclear threat,
nuclear weapons and
testing
War

Economic distance
measured by GDP per
capital
Refugee population by
country or territory of
asylum
Military expenditure
(% of GDP)

People

5

Violence and riots,
suicide bombings,
terrorism, weapons

People

6

Corrupt

People

7

Religion: Muslim

People

8

Their language, not
open to my language

Politics
/government
Politics
/government

9

Politics
/government

11

Authoritarian
government
Government
regulations and
policies, censorship
imposed on their
people, lack of
freedom, oppression
Women’s rights,
male dominated

10

Decayed influence of
armed international
conflicts
The number of people
death in suicide
bombings
CPIA transparency,
accountability, and
corruption in the
public-sector rating
(1=low to 6=high)
Government religion

Inverted score of native
and speaking linguistic
proximity
Civil liberties
Political rights

World Bank

The Quality of Government
Institute (QoG) Standard
Data
International Crisis Behavior
Projects (ICB); UCDP/PRIO
Armed Conflict Dataset
Polity IV-Armed Conflict
and Intervention (ACI)
Datasets-High Casualty
Terrorist Bombings (HCTB)
World Bank

Running on Faith (Lindberg,
2008)-The Peace Research
Institute Oslo (PRIO)
CEPII- Common Native
Language (CNL)
Freedom House
Freedom House

Proportion of seats held World Bank
by women in national
parliaments (%)
Note: All indices are longitudinal except for Indices 7 and 8 (religion and language).
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Table 2. 2. Descriptive Statistics and Correlations
1

2

3

4

5

6

1. Velocity
1.00
2. Emotionality
-0.46
1.00
3. Communality
0.26 -0.23
1.00
4. Nationalism (host)
-0.12
0.12
0.01
1.00
5. Animosity (host vs. home)
0.09 -0.05
0.04
0.08
1.00
6. Social media coverage (home)
-0.16
0.19
-0.25
0.00
0.00
1.00
7. Firm size
-0.10
0.14
-0.20
0.01
0.02
0.55
8. Firm performance (ROA)
-0.04
0.09
-0.09 -0.01 -0.01
0.23
9. Charity giving outside of the US
-0.08
0.06
-0.17 -0.02
0.00
0.36
10. Event topic (business or society)
0.02
0.00
0.05 -0.01
0.00
-0.21
11. Political stability (host)
0.00
0.00
-0.01 -0.01 -0.03
0.00
12. Culture distance (host vs. home)
0.24 -0.21
0.01 -0.07
0.30
0.05
Mean
6.79
0.21 1623.92
7.34 24.48
564.74
Std. errors
2.16
0.50
110.75
4.99
2.02
538.89
Min
1.00 -3.50
10.00
0.50 10.52
10.00
Max
8.00
3.15 1680.00 19.00 44.26 1541.00
Note: Correlations with absolute values of no less than 0.04 are significant at the 0.05 level.
The data for descriptive statistics were not log-transformed.
N = 32,007; Host: Host country; Home: Home country.

7

8

1.00
0.19
0.26
-0.19
0.00
0.03
9.50
2.07
0.08
13.87

1.00
0.24
-0.07
0.01
0.02
0.07
0.11
-12.40
0.41

9

1.00
-0.18
0.07
0.04
0.07
0.26
0.00
1.00

10

1.00
0.00
-0.02
0.92
0.27
0.00
1.00

11

1.00
0.04
-0.58
0.10
-2.27
1.28

12

1.00
0.95
0.53
0.25
2.23
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Table 2. 3. Regressions Predicting Velocity, Emotionality, and Communality of Cross-Border Social Disapproval
Dependent variables

Velocity (Weeks)
Model 1
Model 2

Model 3

Three-way interaction
Animosity x Social media
coverage x Nationalism (H3)
Animosity x Nationalism

Two-way interaction
Animosity x Social media
coverage (H2)
Animosity (host vs. home)

Firm performance (ROA)
Charity giving outside of the US
Event topic (business or society)
Political stability (host)
Culture distance (host vs. home)
Fixed year & fixed industry effects
Log likelihood
Chi squared ratio

Emotionality
Model 5
Model 6

Model 7

0.007***
(0.001)
-0.013
(0.008)
-0.185***
(0.030)
0.377+
(0.200)

Social media coverage x
Nationalism
Nationalism (host)

Direct effect
Social media coverage (home)
(logged) (H1)
Controls
Firm size (logged)

Model 4

-0.090***
(0.008)
-0.278**
(0.113)
-0.300***
(0.056)
-0.036
(0.043)
-0.314**
(0.121)
0.995**
(0.021)
Yes
-67559.09

-0.012***
(0.003)
0.099**
(0.022)

-0.045***
(0.009)
0.109+
(0.061)

-0.033***
(0.008)

0.268**
(0.082)

1.109**
(0.221)

-0.074***
(0.008)
-0.302**
(0.113)
-0.283***
(0.056)
-0.043
(0.044)
-0.314**
(0.121)
0.996**
(0.021)
Yes
-67552.24
13.70***

-0.074***
(0.009)
-0.304**
(0.113)
-0.289***
(0.056)
-0.044
(0.044)
-0.296*
(0.121)
0.959***
(0.023)
Yes
-67538.48
41.22***

-0.088**
(0.009)
-0.290**
(0.112)
-0.320***
(0.055)
-0.006
(0.044)
-0.169
(0.121)
1.106***
(0.038)
Yes
-67289.38
539.42***

Model 8
-0.002***
(0.000)
0.009
(0.002)
0.063***
(0.007)
-0.247***
(0.043)

0.035***
(0.002)
0.183**
(0.025)
0.201***
(0.012)
-0.006
(0.010)
0.106**
(0.026)
-0.209***
(0.005)
Yes
-18737.28

-0.005***
(0.001)
0.031***
(0.005)

0.008***
(0.002)
-0.014
(0.013)

-0.002**
(0.002)

0.119**
(0.018)

-0.221***
(0.048)

0.033***
(0.002)
0.184**
(0.025)
0.200***
(0.012)
-0.005
(0.010)
0.106**
(0.026)
-0.210***
(0.005)
Yes
-18736.67
1.22***

0.033***
(0.002)
0.182**
(0.025)
0.198***
(0.012)
-0.005
(0.010)
0.105**
(0.026)
-0.214***
(0.005)
Yes
-18714.51
45.54***

0.037***
(0.002)
0.178**
(0.024)
0.204***
(0.012)
-0.013
(0.009)
0.082**
(0.026)
-0.252***
(0.008)
Yes
-18383.23
708.10***
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Table 2. 3, continued.
Communality
Model 9
Model 10

Model 11

Model 12

0.061
(0.174)
1.614
(1.142)

0.734***
(0.064)
-2.295***
(0.427)
-19.209**
(1.583)
63.128**
(10.441)
-3.892**
(0.472)
15.179**
(3.176)

-1.212
(4.291)

104.693***
(11.534)

Three-way interaction
Animosity x Social media
coverage x Nationalism (H3)
Animosity x Nationalism
Social media coverage x
Nationalism
Nationalism (host)
Animosity x Social media
coverage (H2)
Animosity (host vs. home)
Direct effect
Social media coverage (home)
(logged) (H1)
Controls
Firm size (logged)

0.316*
(0.464)
-9.758***
(0.396)
-15.982**
(5.951)
-38.840***
(2.923)
-0.334
(2.309)
-12.364+
(6.356)
5.664***
(1.121)
Yes
-194408.92

-9.917***
-9.903***
-10.794***
(0.460)
(0.459)
(0.453)
Firm performance (ROA)
-15.744**
-15.182*
-14.594+
(5.961)
(5.959)
(5.861)
Charity giving outside of the US
-39.013***
-39.028*** -41.762***
(2.934)
(2.933)
(2.888)
Event topic (business or society)
-0.270
-0.386
1.705
(2.310)
(2.309)
(2.273)
Political stability (host)
-12.370+
-10.355
3.015**
(6.356)
(6.360)
(6.303)
Culture distance (host vs. home)
5.654***
3.403***
-2.107***
(1.121)
(1.187)
(1.972)
Fixed year & fixed industry effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
Log likelihood
-194407.69
-194386.99 -193853.59
Chi squared ratio
2.46***
43.86***
1110.66***
Note: + p < .01, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001; Std. errors in parentheses; N = 32,007; Host: Host country; Home: Home country.

74

Figure 2. 1. Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses of Cross-Border Social Disapproval

75

Figure 2. 2 a, b, and c. Two-Way Interaction of Social Media Coverage and Animosity between Home and Host Countries
Predicting a) Velocity, b) Emotionality, and c) Communality of Cross-Border Social Disapproval
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Figure 2. 3. Three-Way Interaction of Social Media Coverage, Animosity between Home
and Host Countries, and Nationalism of Host Country Predicting Velocity of Cross-Border
Social Disapproval
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Figure 2. 4. Three-Way Interaction of Social Media Coverage, Animosity between Home
and Host Countries, and Nationalism of Host Country Predicting Emotionality of CrossBorder Social Disapproval
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Figure 2. 5. Three-Way Interaction of Social Media Coverage, Animosity between Home
and Host Countries, and Nationalism of Host Country Predicting Communality of CrossBorder Social Disapproval
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CHAPTER 4: ESSAY 3
CONSTITUENT SUPPORT TO FIRMS AND COMMUNICATION STRATEGIES VIA
SOCIAL MEDIA AND PRESS RELEASE

80

ABSTRACT
Social media communication plays an important role in making firms visible through
firm responses to constituents. Although an increasing number of firms use social media to
communicate with constituents, scant evidence shows that firms have used this communication
platform effectively. In this paper, we build a theoretical framework depicting how
communication strategies through social media posts and traditional press releases lead firms to
lose or gain constituent support. We argue that firm responses via social media compared to
issuing press releases are more likely to reduce firms’ constituent support. We further suggest
specific communication strategies via social media that may help firms earn constituent support.
We tested the theoretical argument using a comprehensive database, including 1,257,370 tweets
and 81,887 press releases from 286 newly public firms and their constituents during 2007-2016.
Our results show that the more a firm responds to constituents through social media, the more
likely the firm will lose constituent support. We also found that firm press releases can
effectively increase constituent support especially when constituents frequently send firms
questions. However, issuing press releases may reduce constituent support when constituents
express negative emotions on social media. Moreover, for firms that respond to constituents on
social media, our empirical results suggest them be more accommodative and slower. Our study
contributes to management research by offering a counter-intuitive insight that newer
communications tools do not mean they are more effective and suggest firms to think twice
about the adverse impact of emerging communication tools.
Keywords: social media; press release; cheap talk; constituent support, constituent social
evaluation
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Social media as emerging communication tools play a key role in affecting corporate
visibility and building relationships with constituents. Without gatekeepers (e.g., journalists,
editors, news agencies), social media allow firms to have informal and direct conversations with
a significant number of constituents. Although social media are increasingly used by firms
(Wagner, 2014), we know little about whether and how social media usage influences constituent
evaluation of firms.
Gatekeeping theory argues that the reliability of social media communication is easy to
be regarded as suspicious by constituents due to a lack of gatekeeper (Wahl-Jorgensen &
Hanitzsch, 2009). Therefore, the more a firm communicates on social media, the more likely
constituents may doubt the reliability (Coddington & Holton, 2014). Although social media
communication might be perceived as less reliable, it still has reputational costs because a firm
that provides untruthful messages on their current stage will damage their trustworthiness in the
future (Wahl-Jorgensen & Hanitzsch, 2009). Therefore, even though there is a lack of
gatekeepers, firms will not knowingly post false statements because they know the reputation
loss costs will be high (Kim, 1996). Based on this argument, there are several unsolved questions
our research is going to investigate. First, do constituents perceive social media communication
as less reliable? Second, does issuing press releases effectively help them gain constituent
support for those firms being reticent on social media? Third, for those firms responding to
constituents on social media, how can they manage their communication strategies via social
media to build constituent support?
To answer these questions, we draw from gatekeeping theory in communication
(Shoemaker & Vos, 2009; Shoemaker, Vos, & Reese, 2009) and the sense-making perspective
from social psychology (Fiske & Taylor, 2013). Gatekeeping theory argues constituents are more
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likely to trust the information from traditional media than other sources because a “gatekeeper
[i.e., media agencies] controls whether information passes through the channel and what its final
outcome is” (Shoemaker et al., 2009: 74). In other words, constituents are typically negatively
biased towards corporate messages with distrust when no gatekeepers confirm the messages
(Pinkham, 1998; Pollach, 2005). Hence, we suggest firms respond less or be reticent on social
media and only issue press releases through professional newswires. Moreover, because
constituents actively look for information that are consistent with their own beliefs in sensemaking (Pollach, 2005), we argue social media communication may help a firm gain constituent
support if the communication addresses constituents’ needs. For example, constituents pursue
emotional expression through social media, and thus, a firm’s accommodative responses to them
would build a positive constituent-firm relationship.
Newly public firms provide an opportune setting for examining the effectiveness of social
media engagement and communication strategies via social media. This is because in a period—
usually five years—after initial public offerings (IPO) (Pittman & Fortin, 2004), newly public
firms generally experience the “liability of market newness,” meaning they have not yet
“demonstrated an ability to cope effectively with the demands of public trading” (Certo 2003:
433). To reduce the liability, these firms have great motivation to make their ability widely
known to constituents. Social media provides them ideal platforms to access a significant number
of constituents considering roughly 54% of the world’s population in 2017 have active social
media accounts (Chaffey, 2017). To track these firms’ and their constituents’ media activities,
we collected 1,257,370 tweets (380,486 generated by firms and 876,884 generated by
constituents) and 81,887 firm press releases.
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We designed a two-stage empirical test. In the first stage, we used the full samples
including 1,379 firm-year observations of both firms that remained reticent on social media and
those that responded to constituents via social media. The results indicated that newly public
firms’ social media responses lead these firms to lose constituent support. During the second
stage, we split the full samples into two sub-samples; the first sub-sample only includes 738
firm-year observations that had no response to constituents through social media in an
observation year, and the second sub-sample merely includes 641 firm-year observations that
contained conversations with constituents on social media in an observation year. From the
social media reticence group, we found that press releases—especially those issued when
constituents frequently ask firms questions on social media—can significantly increase
constituent support towards firms. From the social media response group, results indicated that
accommodativeness that aligns with constituent needs of emotional expression helps firms win
constituent support. Moreover, we found that a firm’s slower response is more effective for
building constituent support than a quicker response.
Our study provides three major contributions. First, it offers a counter-intuitive insight
that a firm’s social media engagement may not be appreciated by constituents and even lead the
firm to lose constituent support. Many firms may have over-optimistically pursued social media
engagement with constituents without carefully considering the potential adverse impact of these
emerging communication tools. Second, we propose that newer communication tools do not
mean more effective: our results suggest firms that make greater use of traditional press releases
and seek to spread their messages through professional news agencies are more effective at
communicating with constituents than those firms who pursue direct communications through
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social media. Finally, we advance impression management research by examining effectiveness
of communication strategies through social media.
RESPOND LESS THROUGH SOCIAL MEDIA
Communication is perceived as less relevant, reliable, and authentic when it does not
include gatekeepers to filter information (Shoemaker & Vos, 2009; Shoemaker et al., 2009).
Without gatekeepers to verify information reliability, individuals or organizations have little
incentive to maintain information reliability (Farrell & Rabin, 1996). Consequently, the
unverified information usually involves a social dilemma; that is, “individual [or organizational]
self-interested behavior leads to an outcome that is inefficient from the perspective of the group”
(Bracht & Feltovich, 2009: 1036). For this reason, the information receiver may have difficulty
trusting and supporting the information sender.
To avoid any adverse impact caused by this social dilemma, communications from firms
to large groups of constituents has been intermediated by traditional media through granting
interviews and issuing press releases (Kennedy, 2008; Zavyalova et al., 2012). However, in the
social media era, more than half of constituents ask firms questions through social media
(Statista, 2016a, b). In this situation, should a firm respond to a constituent-initiated
communication through social media?
Firm response refers to a firm’s engagement in any constituent-initiated conversation
(Sutton & Callahan, 1987). We argue that firm response through social media is perceived by
constituents as less credible for two reasons. First, a single social media response will be quickly
overwhelmed by millions of other tweets generated per minute, and thus, constituents may be
unsure whether a firm has responded. Second, constituents are usually concerned about the
reliability of firm responses through social media because these messages are not verified by
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gatekeepers but are controlled exclusively by the firm itself. Without gatekeepers’ verification, a
firm can easily manipulate information (Whittington, Yakis-Douglas, & Ahn, 2016: 2414).
According to cognitive dissonance theory, when information receivers are concerned about
information reliability, such as firm responses via social media, they tend to confirm their own
beliefs while they ignore messages responded to by others (Festinger, 1966). This argument is
especially true for newly public firms because constituents generally tend to believe such firms
are unable to cope effectively with market fluctuations (Certo, 2003). Pre-occupied by such
beliefs, constituents are less likely to trust newly public firms’ responses on social media.
Accordingly, a firm may keep a lower level of response frequency—the number of times
a firm responds to constituents’ concerns—through social media. A firm’s less frequent
responses are less likely to remind constituents of their concerns on social media, and prevent
them from generating more concerns. Moreover, social media frequently add new topics, and
since many of them have no direct link to a specific negative event, firms should respond less
frequently in order to avoid reminding constituents of their concerns and allow them to move
onto other new topics (Yang et al., 2010).
A extreme case of the less frequent responses is no response. No response—a firm’s
withdrawal from any conversation with constituents (Sutton & Callahan, 1987)—may help it win
constituent support. With more than 350,000 tweets generated on Twitter per minute (Twitter
Usage Statistics, 2016), constituents are highly overwhelmed by information and have difficulty
knowing whether a firm has responded on social media or not (Bawden & Robinson, 2009;
Hallowell, 2005). In the meantime, a firm’s lack of response allows constituents to switch their
deficit attention to other topics instead of reinforcing their attention on the firm’s inadequacies,
such as market newness liability. Therefore, if a firm can ensure that a negative event will not
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occur, no social media response is more likely to reduce social disapproval accumulation on
social media (Bawden & Robinson, 2009). Taken together, we hypothesize:
Hypothesis 1: The less responses that a firm sends through social media, the more likely
the firm will gain constituent support.
WHERE TO RESPOND AND HOW
Firm Response through Press Release
Press releases are issued by firms and distributed on professional newswires (Zavyalova
et al., 2012). Although the information source are firms themselves, firm press releases are likely
to be perceived by constituents as more credible than social media responses. Gatekeeping theory
suggests is that journalistic practices are linked in a social control system because media
agencies follow up each other’s news and influenced by the reputation of each other (Breed,
1955). For example, the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) often pick up press releases from the PR
Newswire and write stories about firms, and then more media agencies may further follow up the
stories reported by the WSJ. Such cooperated journalistic practices are the “incentives journalists
have to conform to group norms and follow practical considerations” (Shoemaker et al., 2009:
77).
In order to maintain the cooperated relationship in the journalist practices and involve a
“repeated interaction” (Kim, 1996: 787; Whittington et al., 2016), Newswires that distribute
press release would ensure their information sources are reliable, and media agencies that repint
the press release would verify its truthfulness. Constituents believe information coming from
third parties is more objective and credible, than information coming from a firm itself.
Therefore, press releases, which are often reprinted by mass media agencies would be perceived
as more reliable than social media information. Hence, we hypothesize:
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Hypothesis 2: Issuing press releases will help firms increase constituent support.
We further argue that press releases will become more useful when a firm receives
intensive (i.e., frequent and emotional) questions from constituents on social media. When
constituents intensively evaluate a firm through social media, the firm would be careful
regarding how to respond, and therefore, it may need professional journalists’ help to frame an
announcement favorable to itself and to prevent constituents’ self-generated perceptions to
further accumulate on social media (Wilson, Guinan, Parise, & Weinberg, 2011).
Facing the emotional and frequent questions from constituents, firm responses in social
media may provide more opportunities for disgruntled constituents to “throw fuel on the fire” by
providing additional occasions to share their negative evaluations with other constituents
(Gallaugher & Ransbotham, 2010), and to build communality through shared collective identity
(Slater & Rasinski, 2005). As a consequence, firms who attempt to further interact with
constituents on social media may generate even greater criticism. However, firm press releases
abstain from strengthening constituents of collective identity on social media, and thus,
information-overload constituents on social media are more likely to shift attention to incoming
distraction. Moreover, press releases provide constituents a clear interpretation about a firm
event and do not allow constituents to “fuel on the fire” by co-creating content. As a result,
constituents will have limited chance to hijack a story about a firm with off-topic criticisms of
past actions. Accordingly, we propose that:
Hypothesis 3: Firm press releases will be more effective to help a firm gain constituent
support when constituents send frequently (H3a) send emotional (H3b) questions to the
firm through social media.
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Firm Response via Social Media
We propose three communication strategies—more accommodative, slower, and less
frequent responses—if a firm responds to constituents via social media. Accommodativeness
indicates the level of a firm’s intention to accept and acknowledge its causal role in the issue
constituents questioned (Bundy & Pfarrer, 2015). Being more accommodative helps a firm gain
sympathy from constituents and build credibility because constituents perceive the firm’s
willingness to take responsibility (Sutton & Callahan, 1987). Moreover, constituents on social
media have great needs to express their negative emotions, and more accommodative responses
are consistent with such needs (Fiske & Taylor, 2013; Forgas, 1995; Krämer & Winter, 2008).
For theses reasons, if a firm responds to constituents via social media, it may accommodatively
accept constituents’ criticism, instead of reinforcing constituents’ negative emotions.
A slower response is more likely to be based on complete information, and thus likely to
be perceived as more reliable (Gallaugher & Ransbotham, 2010). Constituents’ attention is
overwhelmed by lots irrelevant social media information. Therefore, after an individual
complained through social media, other constituents would not notice whether a firm had
responded or not. Therefore, social media communication allows a firm to wait and see if a
single complaint could lead to more negative evaluations. If not, the firm may let the complaint
fade out by itself. A slower response also allows a firm to spend time investigating an incident
and consider constituents’ interpretations. Taken together, we hypothesize:
Hypothesis 4 (H4): More accommodative (H4a) and slower (H4b) firm responses
through social media are more likely to increase constituent support, compared to less
accommodative, and quicker responses via social media.
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DATA AND METHODS
Sample
We chose newly public firms as our sample because such firms generally have high
motivation to use social media and press releases to be visible to more constituents and these
firms are less likely to have established reputations that might influence the interpretation of their
communications. We defined newly public firms as firms within five years following the IPO
year (Fischer & Pollock, 2004). In other words, we continually observed each firm for five years
following the IPO, or if a firm delisted within five years after the IPO, we observed it from its
first year following the IPO until its delisting year. Specifically, we included the IPOs conducted
in the US during 2006-2011, and thereby our observation years spanned from 2007 to 2016. This
observation window starts from 2007, the milestone year of the social media era given both
Twitter and Facebook were opened to the public in the middle of 2006, and their usage grew
rapidly beginning in 2007. The press release data from RavenPack News Analytics database
(RavenPack) are also since 2007. The observation window ends in 2016, which is the last year
that our sample firms’ financial data are available.
We searched IPO cases and dates from Security Data Corporation (SDC) Platinum’s New
Issues database and the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database (Carter, Dark, &
Singh, 1998; Fischer & Pollock, 2004). Following prior research, we excluded the cases of unit
offerings, spinoffs, reverse leveraged buyouts, limited partnerships and trusts, closed-end mutual
funds, and real estate investment trusts (Bradley, Cooney, Jordan, & Singh, 2004; Pollock &
Rindova, 2003). Then we matched the sample firms to RavenPack to gather press release data
and the Compustat database to collect firm financial data. These processes finally generated
1,379 firm-year observation from 286 new public firms from 2007 to 2016.
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Social Media Posts
We collected 1,257,370 raw tweets that were generated by the sample firms (380,486
tweets) and their constituents about the focal firms (876,884 tweets) during our observation
years. Twitter data have become the most authoritative data sources for social media research
(Hewett et al., 2016) because Twitter is the most popular social media network worldwide
involving more than two billion active users (Statista, 2016b). Social media data and other data
were aggregated into firm-years.
Dependent Variable: Increase of Constituent Support
We measured constituent support by taking three steps. First, we collected 876,884
tweets that were generated by constituents when they evaluated firms (e.g., @GM when they
evaluated General Motor) (Twitter, 2017), and then disambiguated the misspelling,
abbreviations, and special characters in raw tweets to generate the analyzable Twitter text.
Second, we used a standard Twitter sentiment analysis tool to score each tweet as its level of
sentiment, ranging from highly positive (+1.0) to highly negative (-1.0) with 0 presenting neutral
sentiment (Nielsen, 2011). Finally, we created an indicator of constituent support by weighting
tweet sentiment and volume from constituents (Hewett et al., 2016). For example, if there are a
total of 800 positive tweets (0< sentiment scores <+1.0) with an average sentiment score equal to
0.6, and 200 negative tweets (-1.0<sentiment scores <0) with an average sentiment score equal to
-0.3, then constituent support will be calculated as:
(0.6*800-0.3*200) / (800+200) = 0.42.
We measured the increase of constituent support towards a firm i by calculating the value
difference from year t-1 to year t (Xia et al., 2016):
Increase of constituent support i = Constituent support i,t - Constituent support i,t-1
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Independent Variables
To measure our independent variables about firm communication, we collected 380,486
tweets generated by firms and 81,887 firm press releases during our observation years. To
generate analyzable Twitter text, we disambiguated the misspellings, abbreviations, and special
characters in raw tweets. We paired constituents’ tweets and firms’ tweets into conversations by
identifying who asked questions to whom and who responded to whose questions.
To measure firm response frequency, we counted the total number of tweets a firm
responded to constituents per-year and then took the natural logarithm of the total number.
We measured firm press release by taking the natural logarithm of the total number of
press releases a firm issued per-year. Although we gathered the sentiment scores of those press
releases, we did not weight sentiment in this measurement because the press releases generally
have a highly positive sentiment score (greater than 0.9 with 1.0 as the maximum).
Constituents’ intensive social media engagement was measured from two perspectives—
emotion and frequency—by calculating 1) the average sentiment score of those tweets, and 3)
the average proximity in days between two consecutive tweet-posted questions towards the same
firm.
We measured two communication strategies through social media—accommodativeness
and speed. Following Gamache and his colleagues’ (2015) method, we developed our own
dictionary and used this dictionary to run the firm-generated tweets in Linguistic Inquiry and
Word Count (LIWC) 2015 software. Then LIWC generated an accommodative score for each
tweet ranging from 0% to 100% by counting the number of accommodative words and dividing
by the totally number of words in a statement. To build the dictionary, we reviewed impression
management studies relevant to accommodativeness and the literature those studies cited when
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they defined accommodativeness (e.g., Bundy & Pfarrer, 2015; Elsbach, 2003; Lamin & Zaheer,
2012; Marcus & Goodman, 1991; Sutton & Callahan, 1987). Drawing on those articles, we
included 315 words and root words in our dictionary (see Table 3.1). Response speed is
measured using the average day proximity between a constituent’s question to a firm’s answer
consecutively in the same conversation.
---------------------------------Insert Table 3.1 about here
---------------------------------Control Variables
We used fixed effect regression model, which automatically omitted time-constant
control variables (Pollock, Lee, Jin, & Lashley, 2015; Wooldridge, 2003).
At the firm level, we controlled for firm performance (i.e., return on assets), firm size
(i.e., natural logarithm of total sales), financial leverage, increase in institutional investors,
increase in securities analyst coverage, media reputation, and general reputation. Firm
performance, size, and leverage were included because of their potential influence on the postIPO firms’ survival (Fischer & Pollock, 2004; Lowry & Schwert, 2004) and constituent
evaluations towards firms (Ruf, Muralidhar, Brown, Janney, & Paul, 2001). A firm’s media
reputation (online blogs and and traditional media) and general reputation may significantly
influence constituent support (Harrison & Freeman, 1999; Hewett et al., 2016; Zavyalova et al.,
2012). Media reputation was measured by weighting news sentiment and volume together in a
similar way as we measured constituent support (Hewett et al., 2016). General reputation was
measured by counting the total number strengthens that a firm was evaluation by the KLD per
year (MSCI ESG Research Inc., 2015)
At the industry level, we controlled for industry concentration, munificence and
dynamism. Theses industry characteristics affect firm survival after IPO years (Fischer &
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Pollock, 2004). To measure industry concentration, we calculated the Herfindahl-Hirschman
index (HHI). Considering HHI ranges from 1 to 10,000, we took natural logarithm of its values.
We measured industry munificence and industry dynamism using volatility of sales growth in an
industry (based on two-digit SIC code). Industry munificence was the regression slope
coefficient (sales over time) divided by the corresponding mean value of industry sales. Industry
dynamism was calculated by dividing the standard error of the regression slope coefficient (sales
over time) by the mean value for the three-year period preceding the year of divestiture. Larger
values thus indicate greater industry dynamism (Brauer & Wiersema, 2012).
Finally, we controlled influence varied by years, such as the years of financial crisis
(Chang, 2011) and years since IPO (Fischer & Pollock, 2004). All time-variant controls are
lagged by one year compared to our dependent variables to capture longitudinal predictions
(Pozo, 1992). The data to measure control variables were collected from Compustat and
RavenRack.
Estimation Methods
We ran Hausman statistics and the results reject the random effects model and supported
the fixed firm effects model (Wooldridge, 2002). Therefore, we utilize the unbalanced panel data
and employ ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions with fixed effects method in order to
control for the underlying time-variant heterogeneity among firms in our data (Pandey, 2003;
Wooldridge, 2002). For the purpose the robustness, we used random effect approach and
controlled for time constant variables. The results will be reported later.
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RESULTS
Results Generated Using Fixed Effect
Tables 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4 present the means, standard deviations, and correlations of our
variables in full our full sample and two sub-samples. Multicollinearity is not a concern in our
models through VIF tests (Kutner et al., 2004). To construct interaction terms, we mean-centered
independent variables to reduce the influence of different scales (Aiken & West, 1991; Tsai,
2001).
Table 3.5 presents the results of fixed firm effects OLS regressions predicting the
increase of constituent support. Models 1 and 2 were tested by our full sample (n=1,379 firmyear observations) including both firms that were silent on social media and those that responded
through social media. Models 3, 4, and 5 examined a sub-sample that only includes firms without
social media response (n=738 firm-year observations). Models 6 and 7 utilized the other subsample—those firms that conducted social media response (n=641 firm-year observations).
-------------------------------------------Insert Tables 3.2 and 3.3 about here
--------------------------------------------Hypothesis 1 asserted that the more a firm responds to constituents through social media,
the less likely the firm will gain constituent support. Model 2 supported this Hypothesis (β=0.010, p<0.05). Hypothesis 2 predicted that the more press releases that a firm announces, the
more likely the firm will increase its constituent support. Model 4 rejected this Hypothesis (β=0.013, p>0.1) as the coefficient shows the opposite sign as we predicted.
We further explored specific conditions that press releases may help a firm gain
constituent support. In Hypothesis 4, we predicted an interaction effect between firm press
releases and constituents’ social media engagement. As indicated by Model 5, we found that
issuing press releases will help a firm gain constituent support when constituents frequently send
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firm questions via social media (β=0.063, p<0.05). However, opposite to the direction we
predicted, we found that issuing press releases is not an effective strategy when constituents’
emotion on social media is more negative (β=-0.120, p<0.01). It might because press releases are
less effective at tempering constituents’ negative emotions on social media. Figure 3.1 show
these two-way interactions.
-------------------------------------------Insert Figure 3.1 a, c about here
--------------------------------------------Hypothesis 5 predicted that the more accommodative (H5a) and slower (H5b) responses
via social media are more likely to help a firm gain constituent support. Model 7 supported both
Hypotheses 5a and 5b. Specifically, we found the significant effect of more accommodative and
slower responses (β=0.019, p<0.05; β=0.069, p<0.05) on increasing constituent support.
Robustness Check Using Random Effect
We wanted to see if the results are still hold by using random effect approach that allows
including time-constant control variables (Wooldridge, 2002). Given some industries, such as
airline, retail, and consumer products have high visibility on social media (Anderson, Sims,
Price, & Brusa, 2011), we fixed industry effect. Moreover, several time-constant variables about
IPO deals may also influence our results. Our robustness check included those variables, such as
venture capital backing, underpricing, IPO offering size, deal network size (institutional
investors and security analysts), firm age at IPO, and high-tech industry (Fischer & Pollock,
2004). All the results are consistent to our findings using the fixed effect approach.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Theoretical Contributions
This paper built a theoretical framework and empirically examined firms’ communication
strategies that play an important role in increasing constituent support. We specifically
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investigated communication strategies through firm press releases and social media posts, which
have been rarely addressed in previous management research. This lack of prior research is
surprising given social media have become the most prevalent communication tools as roughly
55% of constituents globally have active social media accounts (Twitter Usage Statistics, 2016).
Recent business incidents, such as SeaWorld’s Blackfish boycott and United Airlines’ passengerdragging event disseminated quickly through social media with extremely negative emotions
accumulated. Although many firms nowadays are using social media to propagate themselves or
communicate with constituents, few cases show that firms have used the emerging
communication method effectively (Haines, 2015). Academic studies also know little about the
effectiveness of different communication strategies via social media, nor do they understand
whether social media communication is more effective than firm press releases.
Our study enriched communication strategy literature by providing a theoretical and
empirical investigation of what and how communication strategies on press releases and social
media help firms gain constituent support. Although many firms actively use social media
communication (e.g., Bank of America, United Airlines, and Chipotle), our empirical research
suggests that firms’ social media responses are associated to constituent support decreasing.
Moreover, our results advanced perception management by providing suggestions regarding the
management of constituent perception through press releases and social media in order to gain
constituent support. Specifically, we suggest firms make less frequent, more accommodative,
and slower responses through social media. Firm also may issue press releases and seek
professional newswire’s help when communicating with constituents.
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Practical Implications
Our findings have practical implications for corporate communication. Firms should pay
close attention to where and how they post information. In the social media era, information
diffuses exponentially, quickly, and broadly. We suggest that firms seek help from the
professional media agencies instead of posting the unverified information on social media.
Moreover, communication strategies (e.g., accommodativeness) that satisfy constituents’ specific
needs on social media (e.g., emotional expression) will help firms gain constituent support.
Limitations and Further Research Directions
Two possible limitations may affect the results of this study. First, we encourage further
research to enrich our understanding of communication strategies by extending more theoretical
perspectives. Second, our studies compared the influence of two types of communication
channels—social media and firm press release—on constituents. We encourage further research
to add more media channels, such as newspapers and broadcasts into the comparison.
In conclusion, we developed a deep understanding of the influence of communication
strategies on constituent support. Our findings also remind firms to consider social media’s
effectiveness before they actively use the emerging communication channel.
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APPENDIX
Table 3. 1. Dictionary of Accommodativeness
Words and root words related to accommodativeness (LIWC dictionary format)
abetment*; acced*; accept*; access*; accommodat*; accord*; acknowled*; acquiesc*; acquiesce*;
acquir*; adapt*; adjust*; admiss*; admit*; advance*; advice*; advocacy*; affiliat*; affinity; affirm*;
afflict*; affront; agree*; aid*; alleviat*; alliance; allow*; amenable*; amend*; amiability; amity;
annoyance; antidot*; apolog*; approv*; approval*; arbitrat*; arrange*; assent*; Assist*; atone*;
attent*; attestat*; authenticat*; authoriz*; avowal*; back*; baffl*; balance*; balk; bell*; bemoan;
benef*; benevol*; bewail*; bittern*; bless*; blow; boost*; bounty; care*; chagrin*; change*; charit*;
chivalrous*; circumspect*; collaborat*; comfort*; compact*; compass*; compatib*; compensat*;
complaisance*; complaisant; compli*; complian*; comply*; composi*; Compromis*; compunction;
conced*; concern*; concert*; concess*; concord*; concurr*; condescen*; confess*; confirm*;
conform*; conformit*; congrui*; conscien*; consent*; consider*; consisten*; contract*; contribut*;
contrit*; cooperat*; copout*; corrective; correspondent*; corrobor*; corroborat*; cosmetic; counten*;
counteract*; courtesy; covenant*; curative; declarant*; declarat*; defeat; deference; deliverance;
deplore*; desponden*; disappoint*; disappointment; disciplin*; discomfiture; discomfort;
discomposure; discontent*; discreet; disenchant*; disgruntle*; disillusi*; dismay; disquiet;
dissatisfact*; distress*; dole; donat*; embarrass*; encourage*; endors*; endorse*; endow*; entertain*;
evidence*; excuse*; explan*; extenuat*; facilitat*; failure; favor; fifty-fifty*; fit*; flexible; forbear*;
fretful*; friend*; frustrat*; further*; furtherance; generous; gift; giv*; grant*; grief; guidan*; habit*;
half*; hand*; handout; handy; harbor*; harmony; heartache; heartbreak; help*; hospitable; humb*;
humiliat*; ignominy; imitate*; improv*; initiate*; intak*; irritat*; justifi*; kind*; lament; lamentation;
leave; letdown*; license; lift*; magnanimous; makeup*; malleable; mandate*; mean*; measure*;
mellow; mindful; minis*; ministrat*; misgiving; mitiga*; moan; modifi*; mourn*; neighbor*; nod*;
nonessential; nonsuccess; nostalgia; obedien*; oblig*; obtain*; offer*; ok*; pacify*; pact*; palliative;
pass*; passage*; patient; patron*; peevish*; penal; peniten*; permiss*; permit*; plea*; pliable; polite*;
promot*; prov*; punitive; put-down; qualm; ratific*; ratificat*; ratify*; realiz*; receip*; receipt*;
receiv*; recept*; recogni*; recognit*; recommendat*; reconciliat*; redress*; reformat*; regret*;
rehabilita*; reinforce*; relief; remedial; remorse; reparat*; repentance; rescue; resignat*; respect*;
restorat*; "restorative "; reward; rue*; rueful*; salva*; scruple*; secur*; self-accusat*; selfcondemnat*; self-disgust*; self-reproach*; sellout*; service; setback*; settle*; shame; solicitous;
sorrow; spleen; submiss*; submissive*; subsidy*; suitable*; support*; susten*; sustenance*; sympath*;
tactful; tender; testimon*; thank*; therapeutic; thought*; thumbs; tractab*; trade-off*; treat*;
understand*; undertak*; uneasi*; unfulfill*; union; unison; unselfish*; upset; validat*; validat*; verif*;
vexation*; vindicate*; warmheart*; worry*; yes*; yield*
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Table 3. 2. Descriptive Statistics and Correlations (Full sample; N=1,379)
1
2
3
4
1. Increase of constituent support
1.00
2. Firm response frequency through social media
-0.07
1.00
3. Constituents’ emotion on social media
0.36
-0.17
1.00
4. Constituents’ question frequency on social media
0.23
-0.31
0.47
1.00
5. Firm press release
0.01
0.09 -0.14
-0.24
6. Firm performance (ROA)
0.02
0.02 -0.01
0.00
7. Firm size (Total sales; logged)
0.01
-0.04 -0.07
-0.08
8. Financial leverage
-0.01
-0.02
0.04
0.06
9. Increase in institutional investors
0.05
-0.03
0.12
0.11
10. Increase in securities analyst coverage
0.01
-0.06
0.13
0.18
11. Media reputation (traditional media)
-0.01
0.11 -0.09
-0.15
12. Media reputation (online blogs)
0.02
0.01 -0.14
-0.22
13. General reputation (KLD evaluation)
0.01
0.05
0.09
0.10
14. Market concentration
-0.03
0.03
0.01
-0.03
15. Industry munificence
0.01
-0.10
0.08
0.13
16. Industry dynamism
0.02
-0.03
0.06
0.08
17. Financial crisis years
0.05
-0.15
0.30
0.48
18. Years since IPO
0.02
0.14 -0.27
-0.43
Mean
0.09
87.42 -0.31
94.95
Std. Dev.
0.37
286.01
0.45
93.55
Min
-2.00
0.00 -5.00
0.00
Max
2.00
4108.00
2.00 345.00
Note: Correlations with absolute values of no less than 0.06 are significant at the 0.05 level.

5

6

7

8

9

1.00
0.09
0.34
-0.02
0.00
-0.11
-0.01
0.25
-0.21
0.00
0.07
-0.05
-0.07
0.16
157.48
366.71
0.00
4068.00

1.00
0.41
-0.05
0.02
-0.02
-0.28
-0.02
-0.16
0.05
-0.04
0.01
0.02
-0.02
-0.02
0.14
-0.30
0.16

1.00
-0.14
0.00
-0.08
-0.09
-0.06
-0.15
-0.08
0.02
0.09
-0.07
0.17
5.89
1.93
-1.32
13.26

1.00
0.00
0.01
-0.04
0.03
0.02
-0.10
0.00
-0.02
0.03
-0.06
0.44
4.27
0.00
116.28

1.00
0.40
-0.10
0.03
0.07
-0.05
0.02
0.02
0.05
-0.25
6.56
24.60
-31.00
55.00
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Table 3.2, continued.
10
11
12
13
1. Increase of constituent support
2. Firm response frequency through social media
3. Constituents’ emotion on social media
4. Constituents’ question frequency on social media
5. Firm press release
6. Firm performance (ROA)
7. Firm size (Total sales; logged)
8. Financial leverage
9. Increase in institutional investors
10. Increase in securities analyst coverage
1.00
11. Media reputation (traditional media)
-0.10
1.00
12. Media reputation (online blogs)
-0.02
-0.24
1.00
13. General reputation (KLD evaluation)
0.11
0.04
-0.12
1.00
14. Market concentration
-0.01
-0.03
-0.06
-0.06
15. Industry munificence
0.07
-0.01
-0.02
0.01
16. Industry dynamism
0.03
-0.04
-0.07
0.05
17. Financial crisis years
0.14
-0.09
-0.18
0.04
18. Years since IPO
-0.27
0.22
0.14
-0.06
Mean
0.22
0.00
0.03
0.57
Std. Dev.
4.07
0.04
0.03
0.94
Min
-29.00
-0.12
-0.22
0.00
Max
23.00
0.34
0.18
6.00
Note: Correlations with absolute values of no less than 0.06 are significant at the 0.05 level.

14

15

16

17

18

1.00
0.04
0.12
0.08
0.01
7.24
0.84
4.59
9.21

1.00
-0.20
0.25
-0.05
1.07
0.11
0.30
2.00

1.00
-0.06
-0.04
1.11
0.21
1.01
6.62

1.00
-0.40
0.19
0.40
0.00
1.00

1.00
2.95
1.41
1.00
5.00
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Table 3. 3. Descriptive Statistics and Correlations (Sub-sample: No social media response; N=738)
1
2
3
4
1. Increase of constituent support
1.00
2. Firm press release
0.07
1.00
3. Constituents’ emotion on social media
0.33
-0.06
1.00
4. Constituents’ question frequency on social media
0.17
-0.04
0.44
1.00
5. Firm performance (ROA)
0.01
0.05
-0.02
0.02
6. Firm size (Total sales; logged)
0.02
0.31
-0.07
-0.07
7. Financial leverage
-0.03
-0.01
0.02
0.03
8. Increase in institutional investors
0.05
0.03
0.12
0.09
9. Increase in securities analyst coverage
0.00
-0.03
0.06
0.08
10. Media reputation (traditional media)
0.02
-0.02
-0.09
-0.11
11. Media reputation (online blogs)
0.09
0.24
-0.02
-0.08
12. General reputation (KLD evaluation)
0.01
-0.24
0.15
0.10
13. Market concentration
-0.04
0.00
0.06
0.02
14. Industry munificence
-0.03
0.13
0.06
0.09
15. Industry dynamism
0.00
-0.03
0.02
0.01
16. Financial crisis years
-0.04
0.06
0.18
0.28
17. Years since IPO
0.12
0.09
-0.20
-0.32
Mean
0.15
110.96
-0.10
170.35
Std. Dev.
0.41
235.45
0.37
60.14
Min
-1.33
0.00
-3.00
0.00
Max
1.87 2577.00
2.00
195.00
Note: Correlations with absolute values of no less than 0.07 are significant at the 0.05 level.

5

6

7

8

1.00
0.44
-0.06
0.03
-0.02
-0.19
-0.03
-0.17
0.05
-0.05
0.00
0.04
-0.02
-0.02
0.13
-0.28
0.16

1.00
-0.17
0.01
-0.04
-0.03
-0.06
-0.20
-0.05
0.02
0.09
-0.05
0.14
5.77
2.11
-1.30
13.16

1.00
0.00
-0.01
-0.05
0.06
0.01
-0.13
0.00
-0.02
0.01
-0.07
0.65
5.82
0.00
116.28

1.00
0.48
-0.10
0.06
0.02
-0.05
0.00
0.03
0.01
-0.28
8.59
24.58
-31.00
55.00
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Table 3. 3, continued.
9
10
11
12
1. Increase of constituent support
2. Firm press release
3. Constituents’ emotion on social media
4. Constituents’ question frequency on social
media
5. Firm performance (ROA)
6. Firm size (Total sales; logged)
7. Financial leverage
8. Increase in institutional investors
9. Increase in securities analyst coverage
1.00
10. Media reputation (traditional media)
-0.14
1.00
11. Media reputation (online blogs)
0.01
-0.31
1.00
12. General reputation (KLD evaluation)
0.03
0.07
-0.15
1.00
13. Market concentration
-0.02
-0.04
-0.10
-0.05
14. Industry munificence
0.05
-0.01
-0.01
-0.01
15. Industry dynamism
0.02
-0.01
-0.04
0.04
16. Financial crisis years
0.10
-0.07
-0.11
0.01
17. Years since IPO
-0.23
0.23
0.09
-0.08
Mean
0.89
-0.01
0.02
0.50
Std. Dev.
3.37
0.04
0.03
0.89
Min
-13.00
-0.12
-0.14
0.00
Max
22.00
0.34
0.11
6.00
Note: Correlations with absolute values of no less than 0.07 are significant at the 0.05 level.

13

14

15

16

17

1.00
0.10
0.11
0.15
0.01
7.21
0.88
4.59
9.21

1.00
-0.25
0.28
-0.08
1.08
0.11
0.30
1.81

1.00
-0.11
-0.01
1.13
0.27
1.01
6.62

1.00
-0.38
0.35
0.48
0.00
1.00

1.00
2.46
1.30
1.00
5.00
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Table 3. 4. Descriptive Statistics and Correlations (Sub-sample; Social media response; N=641)
1
2
3
4
5
1. Increase of constituent support
1.00
2. Firm response accommodativeness on
0.04
1.00
social media
3. Firm response speed on social media
-0.04
0.13
1.00
(in days; the greater value means slower)
4. Firm response frequency on social media
0.01
-0.08
0.18
1.00
5. Firm press release
0.03
-0.04
0.20
0.02
1.00
6. Constituents’ emotion on social media
0.34
-0.04
-0.09
-0.06
0.02
7. Constituents’ question frequency on
0.12
-0.02
-0.28
-0.12
-0.10
social media
8. Firm performance (ROA)
0.03
0.02
0.05
-0.02
0.14
9. Firm size (Total sales; logged)
0.03
-0.03
-0.02
-0.09
0.37
10. Financial leverage
-0.04
-0.04
-0.02
0.00
-0.02
11. Increase in institutional investors
0.00
0.02
-0.01
0.10
0.01
12. Increase in securities analyst coverage
-0.04
0.02
-0.06
0.01
-0.11
13. Media reputation (traditional media)
0.01
0.05
0.09
-0.01
-0.07
14. Media reputation (online blogs)
-0.01
-0.10
-0.01
0.06
0.13
15. General reputation (KLD evaluation)
-0.01
0.03
0.09
-0.06
-0.15
16. Market concentration
0.01
0.05
0.08
0.04
-0.01
17. Industry munificence
0.04
0.05
-0.03
-0.11
0.06
18. Industry dynamism
0.00
-0.04
-0.07
-0.09
-0.01
19. Financial crisis years
0.02
0.02
-0.16
-0.06
0.00
20. Years since IPO
0.05
0.03
0.02
-0.21
0.06
Mean
0.02
4.70
3.87 188.07
211.04
Std. Dev.
0.31
1.83
1.80 396.44
469.40
Min
-2.00
2.51
0.69
1.00
0.00
Max
2.00
7.30
8.32
4108 4068.00
Note: Correlations with absolute values of no less than 0.07 are significant at the 0.05 level.

6

7

1.00
0.01

1.00

0.00
0.00
0.03
0.06
0.04
0.04
-0.07
-0.03
0.01
-0.02
0.03
0.00
-0.03
-0.54
0.42
-5.00
1.00

0.03
0.00
-0.01
-0.02
0.00
-0.06
0.02
-0.02
-0.07
-0.02
0.04
0.00
0.00
8.14
23.94
0.03
345.00

8

9

10

1.00
0.37
-0.10
0.02
-0.02
-0.39
0.00
-0.16
0.04
-0.03
0.07
0.01
-0.03
-0.02
0.14
-0.30
0.16

1.00
-0.03
0.00
-0.10
-0.20
-0.11
-0.07
-0.13
0.05
0.14
-0.03
0.19
6.02
1.69
-1.32
13.26

1.00
-0.03
0.03
-0.05
0.04
0.07
-0.03
0.03
0.01
-0.02
0.03
0.20
0.49
0.00
10.46
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Table 3. 4, continued.
11
12
13
14
15
1. Increase of constituent support
2. Firm response accommodativeness on
social media
3. Firm response speed on social media (in
days; the greater value means slower)
4. Firm response frequency on social media
5. Firm press release
6. Constituents’ emotion on social media
7. Constituents’ question frequency on
social media
8. Firm performance (ROA)
9. Firm size (Total sales; logged)
10. Financial leverage
11. Increase in institutional investors
1.00
12. Increase in securities analyst coverage
0.32
1.00
13. Media reputation (traditional media)
-0.08
-0.03
1.00
14. Media reputation (online blogs)
0.02
0.03
-0.22
1.00
15. General reputation (KLD evaluation)
0.10
0.15
0.03
-0.06
1.00
16. Market concentration
-0.03
0.00
-0.03
-0.02
-0.07
17. Industry munificence
0.02
0.04
0.02
0.03
0.03
18. Industry dynamism
-0.04
0.02
-0.11
-0.08
0.06
19. Financial crisis years
0.02
0.06
0.06
-0.09
0.02
20. Years since IPO
-0.19
-0.22
0.13
0.02
0.01
Mean
4.21
-0.56
0.00
0.03
0.65
Std. Dev.
24.42
4.64
0.04
0.03
0.98
Min
-31.00 -29.00
-0.08
-0.22
0.00
Max
55.00
23.00
0.26
0.18
5.00
Note: Correlations with absolute values of no less than 0.07 are significant at the 0.05 level.

16

17

18

19

20

1.00
-0.04
0.21
0.00
-0.02
7.28
0.79
4.59
9.21

1.00
-0.13
0.02
0.10
1.05
0.09
0.58
2.00

1.00
-0.03
-0.01
1.09
0.10
1.01
1.99

1.00
-0.13
0.01
0.12
0.00
1.00

1.00
3.52
1.32
1.00
5.00
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Table 3. 5. Regression Predicting the Increase of Constituent Support (Fix effect automatically excluded time-constant
variables)
Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

Model 6

Model 7
0.019*
(0.011)
0.069*
(0.034)

0.013
(0.031)

0.013
(0.031)

Firm response accommodativeness on
social media
Firm response speed on social media
(in days; the greater value means slower)
Firm press release x Constituents’ emotion
on social media
Firm press release x Constituents’ question
frequency on social media
Firm press release (logged)

-0.120**
(0.043)
0.063*
(0.028)
0.021
(0.019)

0.021
(0.019)

Constituents’ emotion on social media

0.408***
(0.090)

-0.010*
(0.004)
0.406***
(0.091)

0.531***
(0.107)

0.531***
(0.107)

1.003***
(0.113)

0.295*
(0.136)

-0.008
(0.013)
0.298*
(0.138)

Constituents’ question frequency on social
media
Firm performance (ROA)

0.137***
(0.031)
0.102
(0.136)
0.034
(0.024)

0.137***
(0.031)
0.104
(0.136)
0.032
(0.023)

0.209**
(0.064)
0.228
(0.253)
0.027
(0.036)

0.211**
(0.064)
0.225
(0.225)
0.030
(0.038)

-0.061*
(0.126)
0.216
(0.250)
0.030
(0.038)

0.176
(0.135)
0.131
(0.185)
0.022
(0.033)

0.183
(0.136)
0.137
(0.185)
0.026
(0.034)

Financial leverage

0.050
(0.159)

0.041
(0.160)

0.298
(0.250)

0.316
(0.256)

0.315
(0.257)

-0.805
(1.225)

-0.592
(1.307)

Increase in institutional investors

0.053
(0.043)
0.077
(0.192)

0.053
(0.043)
0.074
(0.193)

0.045
(0.07)
-0.047
(0.448)

0.044
(0.071)
-0.083
(0.459)

0.047
(0.069)
0.008
(0.466)

0.054
(0.044)
-0.209
(0.188)

0.047
(0.045)
-0.224
(0.194)

0.419
(0.396)

0.440
(0.397)

0.182
(0.620)

0.184
(0.620)

0.252
(0.586)

(0.269)
(0.452)

0.202
(0.452)

Firm response through social media

Firm size (Total sales; logged)

Increase in securities analyst
coverage
Media reputation (traditional media)

-0.013
(0.030)

-0.126*
(0.055)
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Table 3. 5, continued.
Model 1
0.665
(0.467)
0.007
(0.013)

Model 2
0.640
(0.465)
0.008
(0.013)

Model 3
0.329
(0.665)
0.019
(0.020)

Model 4
0.373
(0.678)
0.018
(0.021)

Model 5
0.419
(0.666)
0.023
(0.020)

Model 6
0.362
(0.650)
0.003
(0.014)

Model 7
0.374
(0.653)
0.007
(0.014)

Market concentration (HerfindahlHirschman index, logged)

-0.219*
(0.090)

-0.218*
(0.090)

0.019
(0.020)

-0.034
0.575

0.082
(0.575)

-0.193+
(0.112)

-0.184+
(0.109)

Industry munificence

-0.233+
(0.135)

-0.247+
(0.135)

-0.198
(0.120)

-0.195
(0.199)

-0.167
(0.199)

-.182
(0.169)

-0.250
(0.174)

Industry dynamism

-0.089
.0683793
-0.063*
(0.032)

-0.092
(0.069)
-0.065*
(0.032)

-0.065
(0.095)
-0.021
(0.037)

-0.067
(0.095)
-0.020
(0.038)

-0.058
(0.096)
-0.019
(0.038)

0.174
(0.131)
0.107
(0.146)

0.179
(0.132)
0.111
(0.149)

0.061
(0.013)
1.546*
(0.686)

0.065*
(0.032)
0.064**
(0.013)

0.134***
(0.020)
-0.167
(4.129)

0.136***
(0.021)
-0.068
(4.129)

0.133***
(0.201)
-0.460
(4.087)

0.022
(0.013)
1.287
(0.889)

0.0246+
(0.014)
1.126
(0.876)

Fixed firm effect

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Observation number

1379

1379

738

738

738

641

641

Media reputation (online blogs)
General reputation (KLD evaluation)

Financial crisis years
Years since IPO
Cons

Note: + p < .01, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001; Std. errors in parentheses;
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Figure 3. 1. Interaction between Firm Press Release and Constituents’ Question Frequency
on Social Media Predicting the Increase of Constituent Support

Figure 3. 2. Interaction between Firm Press Release and Constituents’ Emotion on Social
Media Predicting the Increase of Constituent Support
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION
My three-essay dissertation explored questions that are both theoretical and practical
important—how does social disapproval accumulate and how can firm attenuate social
disapproval by using communication strategies? In addressing these questions, Essay 1
developed a theoretically model, including four social media characteristics that facilitate the
development of social disapproval accumulation and two-stage strategies that attenuate social
disapproval. Essay 2 empirically examined how social disapproval accumulates across national
boundaries by the mobilization of social media coverage, national animosity and nationalism.
Essay 3 empirically tested how communication strategies via social media posts and traditional
press releases help firm gain or lose constituent support.
A key finding is that social media either conducted by constituents or firms may
adversely impact organizational outcomes by accumulating social disapproval on firms. My
dissertation, therefore, suggested the effective communication strategies, such as issuing press
releases, more accommodative, slower, and less frequent responses via social media. My
dissertation makes three contributions to organizational research. First, it introduced the
conception of social disapproval and theorized key social media characteristics that facilitate
social disapproval. Second, it inaugurated a research design to empirically test how social
disapproval accumulates. Third, my dissertation initiatively investigates negative social
evaluations and impression management in the social media era, within the multinational
environment, and as strategies to build constituent support. Thus, my dissertation advances social
evaluation and impression management studies. Ultimately, the dissertation provides the timely
findings both to the social media era that overflows with social media information and to the
business environment that is filled with national conflicts.
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